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Discussion Paper
Human consciousness and its relationship to social
neuroscience: A novel hypothesis
Michael S. A. Graziano and Sabine Kastner
Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
A common modern view of consciousness is that it is an emergent property of the brain, perhaps caused by neuronal
complexity, and perhaps with no adaptive value. Exactly what emerges, how it emerges, and from what specific
neuronal process, are in debate. One possible explanation of consciousness, proposed here, is that it is a construct of
the social perceptual machinery. Humans have specialized neuronal machinery that allows them to be socially
intelligent. The primary role of this machinery is to construct models of other people’s minds thereby gaining some
ability to predict the behavior of other individuals. In the present hypothesis, awareness is a perceptual
reconstruction of attentional state; and the machinery that computes information about other people’s awareness
is the same machinery that computes information about our own awareness. The present paper brings together a
variety of lines of evidence, including experiments on the neural basis of social perception, on hemispatial neglect,
on the out-of-body experience, on mirror neurons, and on the mechanisms of decision-making, to explore the
possibility that awareness is a construct of the social machinery in the brain.
Keywords: Awareness; Neural correlates of consciousness; Social neuroscience; Hemispatial neglect; Attention; Out of
body.
Men ought to know that from the brain, and from the
brain only, arise our pleasures, joys, laughter and jests,
as well as our sorrows, pains, griefs and tears. Through
it, in particular, we think, see, hear, and distinguish the
ugly from the beautiful, the bad from the good, the
pleasant from the unpleasant.
Hippocrates, fifth century BC.
A common neuroscientific assumption about human
consciousness is that it is an emergent property of
information processing in the brain. Information is
passed through neuronal networks, and by an unknown
process consciousness of that information ensues. In
such a view, a distinction is drawn between the infor-
mation represented in the brain, which can be studied
physiologically, and the still unexplained property of
being conscious of that information. In the present
paper, a novel hypothesis is proposed that differs
from these common intuitive notions. The hypothesis
is summarized in the following five points.
First, when a person asserts, “I am conscious of X,”
whatever X may be, whether a color, a tactile sensation,
a thought, or an emotion, the assertion depends on some
system in the brain that must have computed the infor-
mation; otherwise, the information would be unavail-
able for report. Not only the information represented by
X, visual information or auditory information, for exam-
ple, but also the essence of consciousness itself, the
inner feeling attached to X, must be information, or we
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would be unable to say that we have it. In this hypoth-
esis, consciousness is not an emergent property, or a
metaphysical emanation, but is itself information com-
puted by an expert system. This first point raises the
question of why the brain would contain an expert
system that computes consciousness. The question is
addressed in the following points.
Second, people routinely compute the state of
awareness of other people. A fundamental part of
social intelligence is the ability to compute information
of the type, “Bill is aware of X.” In the present propo-
sal, the awareness we attribute to another person is our
reconstruction of that person’s attention. This social
capability to reconstruct other people’s attentional
state is probably dependent on a specific network of
brain areas that evolved to process social information,
though the exact neural instantiation of social intelli-
gence is still in debate.
Third, in the present hypothesis, the same machin-
ery that computes socially relevant information of the
type, “Bill is aware of X,” also computes information
of the type, “I am aware of X.” When we introspect
about our own awareness, or make decisions about the
presence or absence of our own awareness of this or
that item, we rely on the same circuitry whose expertise
is to compute information about other people’s
awareness.
Fourth, awareness is best described as a perceptual
model. It is not merely a cognitive or semantic proposi-
tion about ourselves that we can verbalize. Instead, it is
a rich informational model that includes, among other
computed properties, a spatial structure. A commonly
overlooked or entirely ignored component of social
perception is spatial localization. Social perception is
not merely about constructing a model of the thoughts
and emotions of another person, but also about binding
those mental attributes to a location. We do not merely
reconstruct that Bill believes this, feels that, and is
aware of the other, but we perceive those mental attri-
butes as localized within and emanating from Bill. In
the present hypothesis, through the use of the social
perceptual machinery, we assign the property of aware-
ness to a location within ourselves.
Fifth, because we have more complete and more
continuous data on ourselves, the perceptual model of
our own awareness is more detailed and closer to
detection threshold than our perceptual models of
other people’s awareness.
The purpose of the present paper is to elaborate on
the hypothesis summarized above and to review some
existing evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis.
None of the evidence discussed in this article is con-
clusive. Arguably, little conclusive evidence yet exists
in the study of consciousness. Yet the evidence
suggests some plausibility to the present hypothesis
that consciousness is a perception and that the percep-
tual model is constructed by social circuitry.
The paper is organized in the following manner.
First the hypothesis is outlined in greater detail
(Awareness as a product of social perception).
Second, a summary of recent work on the neuronal
basis of social perception is provided (Machinery for
social perception and cognition). A series of sections
then describes results from a variety of areas of study,
including hemispatial neglect, cortical attentional pro-
cessing, aspects of self-perception including the out-of-
body illusion, mirror neurons as a possible mechanism
of social perception, and decision-making as a means
of answering questions about one’s own awareness. In
each case, the evidence is interpreted in light of the
present hypothesis. One possible advantage of the pre-
sent hypothesis is that it may provide a general theore-
tical basis on which to understand and fit together a
great range of otherwise disparate and incompatible
data sets.
AWARENESS AS A PRODUCT OF
SOCIAL PERCEPTION
The hypothesis that consciousness is closely related to
social ability has been suggested previously in many
forms (e.g., Baumeister & Masicampo, 2010;
Carruthers, 2009; Frith, 1995; Gazzaniga, 1970;
Humphrey, 1983; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Humans
have neuronal machinery that apparently contributes to
constructing models of other people’s minds
(e.g., Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé, & Decety, 2000;
Ciaramidaro et al., 2007; Gallagher et al., 2000;
Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004;
Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Wexler, 2005).
This circuitry may also contribute to building a model
of one’s own mind (e.g., Frith, 2002; Ochsner et al.,
2004; Saxe et al., 2006; Vogeley et al., 2001, 2004).
The ability to compute explicit, reportable information
about our own emotions, thoughts, goals, and beliefs
by applying the machinery of social cognition to our-
selves can potentially explain self-knowledge.
It has been pointed out, however, that self-knowledge
does not easily explain consciousness (Crick & Koch,
1990). Granted that we have self-knowledge, and that
we construct a narrative to explain our own behavior,
how exactly do we become conscious of that informa-
tion, and how does consciousness extend to other infor-
mation domains such as colors, sounds, and tactile
sensations? Constructing models of one’s own mental
processes could be categorized as “access conscious-
ness” as opposed to “phenomenal consciousness”
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(Block, 1996). It could be considered a part of the “easy
problem” of consciousness, determining the information
of which we are aware, rather than the “hard problem” of
determining how we become aware of it (Chalmers,
1995).
Social approaches to consciousness are not alone in
these difficulties. Other theories of consciousness suf-
fer from similar limitations. One major area of thought
on consciousness focuses on the massive, brain-wide
integration of information. For example, in his global
workspace theory, Baars was one of the first to posit a
unified, brain-wide pool of information that forms the
contents of consciousness (Baars, 1983; Newman &
Baars, 1993). A possible mechanism for binding infor-
mation across brain regions, through the synchronized
activity of neurons, was proposed by Singer and col-
leagues (Engel, König, Gray, & Singer, 1990; Engel &
Singer, 2001). Shortly after the first report from Singer
and colleagues, Crick and Koch (1990) suggested that
when information is bound together across regions of
the cortex through the synchronized activity of neu-
rons, it enters consciousness. Many others have since
proposed theories of consciousness that include or
elaborate on the basic hypothesis that consciousness
depends on the binding of information
(e.g., Grossberg, 1999; Lamme, 2006; Tononi, 2008;
Tononi & Edelman, 1998). All of these approaches
recognize that the content of consciousness includes a
great complexity of interlinked information. But none
of the approaches explain how it is that we become
aware of that information. What exactly is the inner
essence, the feeling of consciousness, that seems to be
attached to the information?
Here we propose that the machinery for social per-
ception provides that feeling of consciousness
(Graziano, 2010). The proposal does not necessarily
contradict previous accounts. It could be viewed as a
way of linking social theories of consciousness with
theories in which consciousness depends on informa-
tional binding. If consciousness is associated with a
global workspace, or a bound set of information that
spans many cortical areas, as so many others have
suggested, then in the present proposal the awareness
ingredient added to that global information set is pro-
vided by the machinery for social perception. In parti-
cular, awareness is proposed to be a rich descriptive
model of the process of attention.
The proposal begins with the relationship between
awareness and attention. The distinction between
awareness and attention has been studied before
(e.g., Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, &
Sergent, 2006; Jiang, Costello, Fang, Huang, & He,
2006; Kentridge, Heywood, &Weiskrantz, 2004; Koch
& Tsuchiya, 2007; Lamme, 2004; Naccache, Blandin,
& Dehaene, 2002). The two almost always covary, but
under some circumstances it is possible to attend to a
stimulus and at the same time be unaware of the stimu-
lus (Jiang et al., 2006; Kentridge et al., 2004; Naccache
et al., 2002). Awareness, therefore, is not the same
thing as attention, but, puzzlingly, the two seem redun-
dant much of the time. Here we propose an explanation
for the puzzling relationship between the two:
Awareness is a perceptual model of attention. Like
most informational models in the brain, it is not a literal
transcription of the thing it represents. It is a caricature.
It exaggerates useful, need-to-know information. Its
purpose is not to provide the brain with a scientifically
accurate account of attention, but to provide useful
information that can help guide behavior. In the follow-
ing paragraphs, we discuss first the social perception of
someone else’s attentional state, and then the percep-
tion of one’s own attentional state.
Arguably, one of the most basic tasks in social per-
ception is to perceive the focus of somebody else’s
attention. The behavior of an individual is drivenmainly
by the items currently in that individual’s focus of atten-
tion. Hence, computing that someone is attending to this
visual stimulus, that sound, this idea, and that emotion,
provides critical information for behavioral prediction.
The importance of computing someone else’s state of
attention has been emphasized by others, and forms the
basis for a body of work on what is sometimes called
“social attention” (e.g., Birmingham & Kingstone,
2009; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Frischen, Bayliss, &
Tipper, 2007; Nummenmaa & Calder, 2008; Samson,
Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010).
One of the visual cues used to perceive someone else’s
attentional state is the direction of gaze. Neurons that
represent the direction of someone else’s gaze have been
reported in cortical regions thought to contribute to
social perception including, in particular, the superior
temporal sulcus (STS) area of monkeys and humans
(Calder et al., 2002; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Perrett
et al., 1985; Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore, & McCarthy,
1998; Wicker, Michel, Henaff, & Decety, 1998). Gaze
is, of course, not the only cue. A variety of other cues,
such as facial expression, body posture, and vocaliza-
tion, presumably also contribute to perceiving the focus
of somebody else’s attention.
In the hypothesis proposed here, when we construct
a perceptual model of someone else’s focus of atten-
tion, that informational model describes awareness ori-
ginating in that person and directed at a particular item.
In this hypothesis, the brain explicitly computes an
awareness construct, and awareness is the perceptual
reconstruction of attention. Figure 1 provides an
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example to better explain this proposed relationship
between awareness and attention.
In Figure 1, Abel looks at Bill and Bill looks at the
coffee cup. First consider Bill, whose visual attention is
focused on the cup. It is now possible to provide a fairly
detailed account of visual attention, which has been
described as a process by which one stimulus represen-
tation wins a neuronal competition among other repre-
sentations (for review, see Beck & Kastner, 2009;
Desimone & Duncan, 1995). The competition can be
influenced by a variety of signals. For example,
bottom-up signals, such as the brightness or the sudden
onset of a stimulus, may cause its representation to win
the competition and gain signal strength at the expense
of other representations. Likewise, top-down signals
that emphasize regions of space or that emphasize
certain shapes or colors may be able to bias the com-
petition in favor of one or another stimulus representa-
tion. Once a stimulus representation has won the
competition, and its signal strength is boosted, that
stimulus is more likely to drive the behavior of the
animal. This self-organizing process is constantly shift-
ing as one or another representation temporarily wins
the competition. In Figure 1, Bill’s visual system builds
a perceptual model of the coffee cup that wins the
attentional competition.
Now consider Abel, whose machinery for social
perception constructs a model of Bill’s mind. This
model includes, among other properties, the following
three pieces of information. First, awareness is present.
Second, the awareness emanates from Bill. Third, the
awareness is directed in a spatially specific manner at
the location of the cup. These properties—the property
of awareness and the two spatial locations to which it is
referred—are perceptual constructs in Abel’s brain.
In this formulation, Bill’s visual attention is an event
to be perceived, and awareness is the perceptual coun-
terpart to it constructed by Abel’s social machinery.
Note the distinction between the reality (Bill’s atten-
tional process) and the perceptual representation of the
reality (Abel’s perception that Bill is aware). The rea-
lity is quite complex. It includes the physics of light
entering the eye, the body orientation and gaze direc-
tion of Bill, and a large set of unseen neuronal pro-
cesses in Bill’s brain. The perceptual representation of
that reality is much simpler, containing an amorphous,
somewhat ethereal property of awareness that can be
spatially localized at least vaguely to Bill and that, in
violation of the physics of optics, emanates from Bill
toward the object of his awareness. (For a discussion of
the widespread human perception that vision involves
something coming out of the eyes, see Cottrell &
Winer, 1994; Gross, 1999.) The perceptual model is
simple, easy, implausible from the point of view of
physics, but useful for keeping track of Bill’s state
and therefore for helping to predict Bill’s behavior.
As in all perception, the perception of awareness is
useful rather than accurate.
Consider now the modified situation in which Abel
and Bill are the same person. A person is never outside
a social context because he is always with himself and
can always use his considerable social machinery to
perceive, analyze, and answer questions about himself.
Abel/Bill focuses visual attention on the coffee cup.
Abel/Bill also constructs a model of the attentional
process. The model includes the following informa-
tion: awareness is present; the awareness emanates
from me; the awareness is directed at the cup. If
asked, “Are you aware of the cup?” Abel/Bill can
cognitively scan the contents of this model and on
that basis answer, “Yes.”
If asked, “What exactly do you mean by awareness
of the cup?”Abel/Bill can again scan the informational
model, abstract properties from it, and report some-
thing like, “My awareness is a feeling, a vividness, a
mental seizing of the stimulus. My awareness feels like
it is located inside me. In a sense it isme. It is my mind
apprehending something.” These summaries reflect the
brain’s model of the process of attention.
Awareness, in this account, is one’s social intelli-
gence perceiving one’s focus of attention. It is a
second-order representation of attention. In that sense,
the hypothesis may seem similar to proposals invol-
ving metacognition (e.g., Carruthers, 2009; Pasquali,
Timmermans, & Cleeremans, 2010; Rosenthal, 2000).
Metacognition generally refers to semantic knowledge
about one’s mental processes, or so-called “thinking
about thinking.” The proposal here, however, is
Abel Bill Cup
Visual Attention“Bill is aware
on cupof  the cup”
Figure 1. Awareness as a social perceptual model of attention. Bill
has his visual attention on the cup. Abel, observing Bill, constructs a
model of Bill’s mental state, using specialized neuronal machinery
for social perception. Part of that model is the proposition that Bill is
aware of the cup. In this formulation, awareness is a perceptual
property that is constructed to represent the attentional state of a
brain. We perceive awareness in other people. We can use the same
neuronal machinery of social perception to perceive awareness in
ourselves.
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different. While people clearly have semantic knowl-
edge about their attentional state, what is proposed here
is specifically the presence of a rich, descriptive, per-
ceptual model of attentional state that, like most per-
ception, is computed involuntarily and is continuously
updated. When we gain cognitive access to that per-
ceptual model and summarize it in words, we report it
as awareness. Block (1996) distinguished between
phenomenal consciousness (the property of conscious-
ness itself) and access consciousness (cognitive access
to the property of consciousness). In the present theory,
the perceptual representation of attentional state is akin
to phenomenal consciousness. The cognitive access to
that representation, which allows us abstract semantic
knowledge and to report on it, is akin to access
consciousness.
In the present hypothesis, we propose a similarity
between perceiving someone else’s awareness and per-
ceiving one’s own awareness. Both are proposed to be
social perceptions dependent on the same neuronal
mechanisms. Yet, do we really perceive someone
else’s awareness in the same sense that we perceive
our own, or do we merely acknowledge in an abstract
or cognitive sense that the other person is likely to be
aware? In a face-to-face conversation with another
person, so many perceptions and cognitive models
are present regarding tone of voice, facial expression,
gesture, and the semantic meaning of the other person’s
words, that it is difficult to isolate the specific percep-
tual experience of the other person’s awareness. Yet,
there is one circumstance in which extraneous percep-
tions are minimized and the perception of someone
else’s awareness is relatively isolated and therefore
more obvious. This circumstance is illustrated in
Figure 2. Everyone is familiar with the spooky sensa-
tion that someone is staring at you from behind
(Coover, 1913; Titchner, 1898). Presumably built on
lower level sensory cues such as subtle shadows or
sounds, the perception of a mind that is located behind
you and that is aware of you is a type of social percep-
tion and a particularly pure case of the perception of
awareness. Other aspects of social perception are
stripped away. The perceptual illusion includes a
blend of three components: the perception that aware-
ness is present, the perception that the awareness ema-
nates from a place roughly localized behind you, and
the perception that the awareness is directed at a spe-
cific object (you). This illusion helps to demonstrate
that awareness is not only something that a brain per-
ceives to be originating from itself––I am aware of this
or that––but something that a brain can perceive as
originating from another source. In the present argu-
ment, awareness is a perceptual property that can be
attributed to someone else’s mind or to one’s own
mind.
The present hypothesis emerges from the realization
that social perception is not merely about reconstruct-
ing someone else’s thoughts, beliefs, or emotions, but
also about determining the state of someone else’s
attention. Information about someone else’s attention
is useful in predicting the likely moment-by-moment
behavior of the person. The social machinery computes
that Bill is aware of this, that, and the other. Therefore
social perception, when applied to oneself, provides
not only a description of one’s own inner thoughts,
beliefs, and feelings, but also a description of one’s
awareness of items in the outside environment. It is for
this reason that awareness, awareness of anything,
awareness of a color, or a sound, or a smell, not just
self-awareness, can be understood as a social
computation.
The examples given above focus on visual attention
and visual awareness. The concept, however, is gen-
eral. In the example in Figure 1, Bill could just as well
attend to a coffee cup, a sound, a feeling, a thought, a
movement intention, or many other cognitive, emo-
tional, and sensory events. In the present hypothesis,
awareness is the perceptual reconstruction of attention,
and therefore anything that can be the subject of atten-
tion can also be the subject of awareness.
MACHINERY FOR SOCIAL
PERCEPTION AND COGNITION
Arguably, social neuroscience began with the discov-
ery by Gross and colleagues of hand and face cells in
the inferior temporal cortex of monkeys (Desimone,
Albright, Gross, & Bruce, 1984; Gross, Bender, &
Rocha-Miranda, 1969). Further work indicated that a
neighboring cortical area, the superior temporal poly-
sensory (STP) area, contains a high percentage of neu-
rons tuned to socially relevant visual stimuli including
faces, biological motion of bodies and limbs, and gaze
direction (Barraclough, Xiao, Oram, & Perrett, 2006;
Bruce, Desimone, & Gross, 1981; Jellema & Perrett,
Perceived
source of
awareness
Perceived focus
of  awareness
Figure 2. The perceptual illusion that somebody behind you is
staring at you.
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2003, 2006; Perrett et al., 1985). In humans, through
the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), a region that responds more strongly to the
sight of faces than to other objects was identified in the
fusiform gyrus (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun,
1997). Areas in the human STS were found to become
active during the perception of gaze direction and of
biological motion such as facial movements and reach-
ing (Grossman et al., 2000; Pelphrey, Morris,
Michelich, Allison, & McCarthy, 2005; Puce et al.,
1998; Thompson, Hardee, Panayiotou, Crewther, &
Puce, 2007; Vaina, Solomon, Chowdhury, Sinha, &
Belliveau; Wicker et al., 1988). This evidence from
monkeys and humans suggests that the primate visual
system contains a cluster of cortical areas that specia-
lizes in processing the sensory cues related to faces and
gestures that are relevant to social intelligence.
Other studies in social neuroscience have investi-
gated a more cognitive aspect of social intelligence
sometimes termed “theory of mind” (Frith & Frith,
2003; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Tasks that require
the construction of models of the contents of other
people’s minds have been reported to engage a range
of cortical areas, including the STS, the temporoparie-
tal junction (TPJ), and the medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC), with a greater but not exclusive activation in
the right hemisphere (Brunet et al., 2000; Ciaramidaro
et al., 2007; Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000;
Goel, Grafman, Sadato, & Hallett, 1995; Saxe &
Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Wexler, 2005; Vogeley
et al., 2001).
The relative roles of these areas in social perception
and cognition are still in debate. It has been suggested
that the TPJ is selectively recruited during theory-of-
mind tasks, especially during tasks that require con-
structing a model of someone else’s beliefs (Saxe &
Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Wexler, 2005). Damage to
the TPJ is associated with impairment in theory-of-
mind reasoning (Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, &
Humphreys, 2004; Samson et al., 2004; Weed,
McGregor, Feldbaek Nielsen, Roepstorff, & Frith,
2010).
The STS, adjacent to the TPJ, has been argued to play
a role in perceiving someone else’s movement intentions
(Blakemore et al., 2003; Pelphrey, Morris, & McCarthy,
2004; Wyk, Hudac, Carter, Sobel, & Pelphrey, 2009).
Not only is the STS active during the passive viewing of
biological motion, as noted above, but the activity dis-
tinguishes between goal-directed actions, such as reach-
ing to grasp an object, and non-goal-directed actions,
such as arm movements that do not terminate in a grasp
(Pelphrey et al., 2004). Even when a subject views
simple geometric shapes that move on a computer
screen, movements that are perceived as intentional
activate the STS whereas movements that appear
mechanical do not (Blakemore et al., 2003).
The role of the MPFC is not yet clear. It is consis-
tently recruited in social perception tasks and theory-
of-mind tasks (Brunet et al., 2000; Fletcher et al., 1995;
Frith, 2002; Gallagher et al., 2000; Goel et al., 1995;
Passingham, Bengtsson, & Lau, 2010; Vogeley et al.,
2001), but lesions to it do not cause a clear deficit in
theory-of-mind reasoning (Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith,
& Husain, 2004). Some speculations about the role of
the MPFC in social cognition are discussed in subse-
quent sections.
Taken together, these studies suggest that a network
of cortical areas, mainly but not exclusively in the right
hemisphere, collectively build models of other minds.
Different areas within this cluster may emphasize dif-
ferent aspects of the model, though it seems likely that
the areas interact in a cooperative fashion.
The view that social perception and cognition are
emphasized in a set of cortical areas dedicated to social
processing is not universally accepted. At least two
main rival views exist. One view is that the right TPJ
and STS play a more general role related to attentional
processing rather than a specific role related to social
cognition (e.g., Astafiev, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2006;
Corbetta, Kincade, Ollinger, McAvoy, & Shulman,
2000; Mitchell, 2008; Shulman et al., 2010). A second
alternative view is that social perception is mediated at
least partly by mirror neurons in the motor system that
compute one’s own actions and also simulate the
observed actions of others (e.g., Rizzolatti &
Sinigaglia, 2010). Both of these alternative views are
discussed in subsequent sections. Much of the discus-
sion below, however, is based on the hypothesized role
of the right TPJ and STS in social perception and social
cognition.
PREDICTION 1: DAMAGE TO THE
MACHINERY FOR SOCIAL
PERCEPTION SHOULD CAUSE A
DEFICIT IN AWARENESS
If the present proposal is correct, if awareness is a
construct of the machinery for social perception, then
damage to the right TPJ and STS, the brain areas most
associated with constructing perceptual models of
other minds, should sometimes cause a deficit in
one’s own awareness. These cortical regions are het-
erogeneous. Even if we assume their role in social
cognition, different sub-areas probably emphasize dif-
ferent functions. As discussed in the next section, the
sub-regions of TPJ involved in attention may be par-
tially distinct from sub-regions involved in theory of
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mind (Scholz, Triantafyllou, Whitfield-Gabrieli,
Brown, & Saxe, 2009). Therefore, even in the present
hypothesis, a lesion to the TPJ and STS should not
always affect all aspects of social cognition equally. A
range of symptoms might result. The present hypoth-
esis does, however, make a clear prediction: Damage to
the right TPJ and STS should often be associated with a
deficit in consciousness.
The clinical syndrome that comes closest to an
awareness deficit is hemispatial neglect, the loss of
processing of stimuli usually on the left side of space
after damage to the right hemisphere of the brain
(Brain, 1941; Critchley, 1953). Patients classically
fail to report, react to, or notice anything on the left
half of space, whether visual, auditory, tactile, or mem-
ory. The left half of space, and any concept that it ever
existed, are erased from the patient’s awareness.
It is now generally accepted that there is no single
neglect syndrome. A range of lesion sites can result in
neglect, and different neglect patients can have some-
what different mixtures of symptoms (Halligan, Fink,
Marshall, & Vallar, 2003; Halligan & Marshall, 1992;
Vallar, 2001). It is therefore not correct to attribute
neglect to a single brain area or mechanism. It has
been reported, however, that a strong form of neglect,
the almost total loss of conscious acknowledgment of
the left side of space or anything in it, occurs most often
after damage to the right TPJ (Valler & Perani, 1986).
In at least one subset of neglect patients who lacked any
accompanying low-level blindness, and in this sense
were more “pure” in their neglect symptoms, the most
common lesion site was ventral and anterior to the TPJ,
in the right STS (Karnath, Ferber, & Himmelbach,
2001). Temporary interference with the right TPJ by
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) has also been
reported to induce symptoms of left hemispatial
neglect (Meister et al., 2006).
Some have argued that neglect is more commonly
associated with damage to the posterior parietal lobe
rather than to the more ventral TPJ or STS (Mort et al.,
2003). A parietal locus for neglect is certainly a more
traditional view (Brain, 1941; Critchley, 1953; Gross &
Graziano, 1995). Neglect symptoms can also be
observed after frontal lesions, though they tend to be
less severe (Heilman & Valenstein, 1972a; Mesulam,
1999; Ptak & Schnider, 2010). These parietal and fron-
tal sites for neglect are consistent with the proposal of a
parietofrontal network for the top-down control of
attention (Ptak & Schnider, 2010; Szczepanski,
Konen, & Kastner, 2010). How can parietofrontal
sites for neglect be reconciled with the observation of
severe neglect from lesions in the TPJ and STS? One of
the primary reasons for these differences among stu-
dies may be a disagreement over the definition of
neglect. Different tests for neglect may result in a
selection of different patient populations and therefore
different observed lesion sites (Ferber & Karnath,
2001; Rorden, Fruhmann, Berger, & Karnath, 2006).
In particular, the two most common clinical tests for
neglect may measure different deficits. In a line can-
cellation test, the patient crosses out short line seg-
ments scattered over a visual display. This test
measures awareness because the patient cancels only
the line segments that reach awareness and fails to
cancel the line segments that do not reach awareness.
In contrast, in a line-bisection task, the patient attempts
to mark the center of a long horizontal line. This test
does not measure awareness or the lack thereof, since
the patient is always aware of the horizontal line.
Instead the test measures a relative response bias
toward one side, perhaps caused by an underlying
attentional bias. Different variants of neglect, revealed
by these different tests, might be associated with dif-
ferent lesion sites. It is of interest, given the present
hypothesis, that neglect defined as an awareness deficit
through the use of line cancellation was associated with
more ventral lesions in the STS (Ferber & Karnath,
2001; Karnath et al., 2001; Rorden et al., 2006).
The point of the present section is not that neglect is
“really” an awareness deficit instead of an attentional
bias, and not that it is “really” caused by lesions to the
right TPJ or STS instead of to the right inferior parietal
lobe. Undoubtedly, different symptoms and lesions
sites can fall under the more general label of hemispa-
tial neglect. The present hypothesis predicts that there
should be at least two different kinds of neglect asso-
ciated with two different brain systems, one associated
with the process of controlling attention (neglect
caused by damage to parietofrontal attentional
mechanisms) and the other associated with the process
of perceptually representing attention (neglect caused
by TPJ and STS damage).
Does the unilateral nature of neglect argue against
the present interpretation? Shouldn’t a consciousness
area, if damaged, lead to a total loss of conscious
experience and not merely a unilateral loss? We do
not believe the laterality of neglect argues against the
present interpretation. If social perception and social
cognition were found to activate a right hemisphere
region only, then damage to that region, according to
the present theory, might eliminate all consciousness.
The studies reviewed above on the neuronal basis of
social perception and social cognition, however, sug-
gest that these functions are represented in a bilateral
manner with a strong emphasis on the right side. If
consciousness is a construct of the social machinery, as
suggested here, then it is portioned in some unequal
manner between the hemispheres. One would expect,
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therefore, that damage to the system for social percep-
tion would, depending on the hemisphere, have an
asymmetric effect on consciousness.
Some controversy surrounds the exact explanation
of the unilateral nature of neglect. One view is a repre-
sentational hypothesis (Heilman & Valenstein, 1972b;
Mesulam, 1981, 1999). In that hypothesis, the right
hemisphere contains some critical type of representa-
tion needed for awareness, which covers both sides of
space, whereas the left hemisphere contains a represen-
tation only of the right side of space. Damage to the
right hemisphere therefore leaves the patient without
awareness of the left side of space, whereas damage to
the left hemisphere leaves the patient mainly behavio-
rally intact. An alternative explanation is based on the
concept of interhemispheric competition among con-
trollers of attention (Kinsbourne, 1977; Szczepanski
et al., 2010). In that view, damage to the parietal lobe
on one side reduces the ability of the attentional control
system that serves the opposite side of space. An
imbalance is created and attention is unavoidably
drawn to the ipsilesional side of space. The present
theory of consciousness may be able to accommodate
both of these seemingly conflicting views of the
mechanisms of neglect. In the present theory, the
brain contains at least two general processes related
to attention. One is the control of attention, perhaps
more emphasized in a parietofrontal network, lesions
to which may result in a more competition-style imbal-
ance of attention; and the other is the perceptual repre-
sentation of attention, emphasized in more ventral
areas involved in social perception, including the TPJ
and the STS, damage to which may result in a more
representational-style neglect.
PREDICTION 2: THE MACHINERY FOR
SOCIAL PERCEPTION SHOULD CARRY
SIGNALS THAT CORRELATE WITH
ATTENTION
In the present hypothesis, a basic task of social percep-
tion is to reconstruct the focus of someone else’s atten-
tion. In the same manner, in perceiving oneself, the
social machinery reconstructs one’s own constantly
changing focus of attention. A prediction that follows
from this hypothesis is that tasks that involve focusing
or shifting attention should evoke brain activity not
only in areas that participate in attentional control
(such as the parietofrontal attention network; for
review, see Beck&Kastner, 2009) but also in the social
circuitry that generates a reconstruction of one’s focus
of attention. The prediction is therefore that the right
TPJ and STS should be active in association with
changes in attention.
Area TPJ and the adjacent, caudal STS show ele-
vated activity in response to stimuli that are unex-
pected, that appear at unexpected locations, or that
change in an unexpected manner (Astafiev et al.,
2006; Corbetta et al., 2000; Shulman et al., 2010).
This response to salient events is strongest in the right
hemisphere. It has therefore been suggested that the
TPJ and the STS are part of a right-lateralized system, a
“ventral network” that is involved in some aspects of
spatial attentional processing (Astafiev et al., 2006;
Corbetta et al., 2000; Shulman et al., 2010).
The attention-related responses found in the STS
and the TPJ could be viewed as contradictory to the
social functions proposed for the same areas. It could
be argued that the attention findings challenge the view
that the right STS and TPJ are in any way specialized
for social processing. Perhaps they serve a more gen-
eral function related to attention. In the present hypoth-
esis, however, the two proposed functions are
compatible. There is no contradiction. The social
machinery is constantly computing and updating a
model of one’s own mind, and central to that model is
a representation of one’s focus of attention. Tracking an
individual’s attention is a fundamental task in social
perception.
An alternate explanation of why attentional func-
tions and social functions are both represented in the
right TPJ and STS is that the two functions are empha-
sized in different cortical areas that happen to be so
near each other that fMRI cannot easily resolve them.
One functional imaging study indicated that the two
types of tasks recruited overlapping areas of activity in
the TPJ with spatially separated peaks (Scholz et al.,
2009). This attempt to separate the “attention” sub-area
of TPJ from the “theory-of-mind” sub-area, however,
does not entirely address the underlying issue of proxi-
mity. The cortex is generally organized by functional
proximity. Similar or related functions tend to be pro-
cessed near each other (Aflalo & Grazianio, 2011;
Graziano &Aflalo, 2007). This trend toward functional
clustering is certainly true in the social domain. Even if
some spatial separation exists between attentional
functions and theory-of-mind functions, why are the
two functions clustered so closely within the right TPJ
and STS? Rather than view this proximity of different
functions as a contradiction, or suggest that one func-
tion must be correct and the other a mistake, or suggest
that the functions must be separate from each other and
co-localized merely as an accident of brain organiza-
tion, it is suggested here that the functions share a
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common cause and therefore are not mutually contra-
dictory. In the present hypothesis, reconstructing some-
one’s beliefs (such as in a false belief task) is only one
component of social perception. Another component is
tracking someone’s attention; a third is constructing
a model of someone’s movement intentions.
Presumably, many other components of social percep-
tion exist, and these components may be represented
cortically in adjacent, partially separable regions.
PREDICTION 3: THE MACHINERY FOR
SOCIAL PERCEPTION SHOULD
CONSTRUCTA SELF-MODEL
A direct prediction of the present hypothesis is that the
cortical machinery that constructs models of other
minds should also construct a perceptual model of
one’s own mind.
Some of the most compelling evidence on the self-
model involves the out-of-body illusion, in which the
perceived location of the mind no longer matches the
actual location of the body. It is essentially an error in
constructing a perceptual model of one’s own mind.
Perceptual mislocalizations of the self can be induced
in normal, healthy people by cleverly manipulating
visual and somatosensory information in a virtual-
reality setup (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager, Tadi,
Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007). A complete out-of-body
illusion can also be induced with electrical stimulation
of the cortex. In one experiment, Blanke, Ortigue,
Landis, and Seeck (2002) electrically stimulated the
cortical surface in an awake human subject. When
electrical stimulation was applied to the TPJ in the
right hemisphere, an out-of-body experience was
induced. The stimulation evidently interfered with the
machinery that normally assigns a location to the self.
Subsequent experiments showed that tasks that involve
mentally manipulating one’s spatial perspective evoke
activity in the right TPJ (Blanke et al., 2005; Zacks,
Vettel, &Michelon, 2003) and are disrupted by TMS of
the right TPJ (Blanke et al., 2005). The evidence sug-
gests that a specific mechanism in the brain is respon-
sible for building a spatial model of one’s own mind,
and that the right TPJ plays a central role in the process.
Given that the right TPJ has been implicated so
strongly in the social perception of others, this evi-
dence appears to support the hypothesis that the
machinery for social perception also builds a percep-
tual model of one’s own mental experience.
An entire subfield of neuroscience and psychology
is devoted to the subject of the body schema (for
review, see Graziano &Botvinick, 2002). For example,
experiments have examined the neuronal mechanisms
by which we know the locations of our limbs, incorpo-
rate tools into the body schema, or experience body-
shape illusions. However, among the many studies on
the body schema, the particular phenomenon of the
out-of-body experience is uniquely relevant to the dis-
cussion of awareness. The reason is that the out-of-
body experience is specifically a spatial mislocaliza-
tion of the source of one’s awareness.
The very existence of an out-of-body illusion could
be interpreted as evidence in support of the present
hypothesis, for the following reasons. Suppose that
awareness is not explicitly computed, as hypothesized
here, but instead is an emergent property produced as a
byproduct of neuronal activity. Neurons compute and
transmit information, and, as a result, somehow aware-
ness of that information occurs. Why would we feel the
awareness as located in, and emanating from, our own
selves? By what mechanism does the awareness feel as
though it is anchored here or anywhere else? The fact
that awareness comes with a perceived location sug-
gests that it is a perceptual model that, like all percep-
tion, is associated with a computed spatial location.
Usually, one does not notice that awareness has a
perceived location. Its spatial structure, emanating
from inside one’s own body, is so obvious and so
ordinary that we take it for granted. The out-of-body
illusion, in which the spatial computation has gone
awry, allows one to realize that awareness comes with
a computed spatial arrangement. Evidently, perceptual
machinery in the brain computes one’s awareness and
assigns it a perceived source inside one’s body, and
interference with the relevant circuitry results in an
error in the computation. The out-of-body experience
demonstrates that awareness is a computation subject
to error.
In a second general approach to the self-model,
subjects in a series of experiments performed self-
perception tasks such as answering questions about
their own feelings or beliefs, or monitoring their own
behavior while brain activity was measured through
functional imaging (Frith, 2002; Ochsner et al., 2004;
Passingham et al., 2010; Saxe et al., 2006; Vogeley
et al., 2001). The network of areas recruited during
self-perception included the right TPJ, STS, and
MPFC. The activity in the MPFC was the largest and
most consistent. Again, the findings appear to support
the general hypothesis that the machinery for social
perception is recruited to build a perceptual model of
the self. These functional imaging studies on the self-
model, however, are less pertinent to the immediate
question of awareness. The reason is that the studies
examined self-report of emotions or thoughts, not the
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report of awareness itself. The focus of the present
proposal is not self-awareness in particular, but aware-
ness in general. It is extremely difficult to pinpoint the
source of awareness in a functional imaging study of
this type, because regardless of the task, whether one is
asked to be aware of one’s own mind state or of some-
one else’s, one is nonetheless aware of something, and
therefore the computation of awareness is present in
both experimental and control tasks.
CHALLENGE 1: HOW CAN THE INNER
“FEELING” OF AWARENESS BE
EXPLAINED?
Thus far, we have presented a novel hypothesis about
human consciousness, outlined three general predic-
tions that follow from the hypothesis, and reviewed
findings that are consistent with those predictions.
The evidence is by no means conclusive, but does
suggest that the hypothesis has some plausibility.
Human consciousness may be a product of the same
machinery that builds social perceptual models of other
people’s mental states. Arguably, the strongest evi-
dence in favor of the hypothesis is that damage to that
social machinery causes a profound deficit in con-
sciousness. The hypothesis, however, also has some
potential challenges. Several aspects of conscious
experience are not, at the outset, easily explainable by
the present hypothesis. We address three of these
potential challenges to the hypothesis. In each case,
we offer a speculation about how the hypothesis might
explain, or at least be compatible with, the known
phenomena. These sections are necessarily highly
speculative, but the issues must be addressed for the
present hypothesis to have any claim to plausibility.
The first challenge we take up concerns the differ-
ence between constructing an informational model
about awareness and actually “feeling” aware. In the
present hypothesis, networks that are expert at social
computation analyze the behavior of other people and
compute information of the type, “Bill is aware of X.”
The same networks, by hypothesis, compute informa-
tion of the type, “I am aware of X,” thereby allowing
one to report on one’s own awareness. Can such a
machine actually “feel” aware, or does it merely com-
pute an answer without any inner experience?
The issue is murky. If you ask yourself, “Am I
merely a machine programmed to answer questions
about awareness, or do I actually feel my own aware-
ness,” you are likely to answer yes, you actually feel it.
You might even specify that you feel it inside you as a
somewhat amorphous but nonetheless real thing. But
in doing so, you are merely computing the answers to
other questions. Distinguishing between actually hav-
ing an inner experience, and merely computing, when
asked, that you have an inner experience, is a difficult,
perhaps impossible task.
In the present account, we are not hypothesizing that
a set of semantic, symbolic, or linguistic propositions
can take the place of the inner essence of awareness,
but that a representation, an informational picture,
comprises awareness. In the distinction between phe-
nomenal consciousness and access consciousness sug-
gested by Block (1996), the informational
representation proposed here is similar to phenomenal
consciousness, and our ability to cognitively access
that representation and answer questions about it is
similar to access consciousness.
Yet, even assuming a rich representational model of
attention, and even assuming that the model comprises
what we report to be awareness, why does it “feel” like
something to us? Why the similarity between aware-
ness and feeling? To address the issue, we begin with a
set of illusions, both related to the spatial structure
assigned to the model of awareness.
As mentioned in the previous section, the out-of-
body experience is the illusion of floating outside your
own body. The perceived source of your awareness no
longer matches the actual location of your body. The
illusion can be induced by direct electrical stimulation
applied to the right TPJ (Blanke et al., 2002). Similar
mislocalizations of the self can be induced in people by
manipulating visual and somatosensory information in
a virtual-reality setup (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager
et al., 2007). Evidently, a specific mechanism in the
brain is responsible for embodiment, or building a
spatial model of one’s own awareness.
Does a similar property of embodiment apply when
constructing a model of someone else’s awareness?
The illusion illustrated in Figure 2 suggests that a
model of someone else’s awareness does come with
an assigned location. The perception that someone is
staring at you from behind (Coover, 1913; Titchner,
1898) includes a spatial structure in which awareness
emanates from a place roughly localized behind you
and is directed at you.
These illusions demonstrate a fundamental point
about social intelligence that is often ignored. When
building a model of a mind, whether one’s own or
someone else’s, the process is not merely one of infer-
ring disconnected mental attributes––beliefs, emo-
tions, intentions, awareness. The model also has a
spatial embodiment. The model, like any other percep-
tual model, consists of a set of attributes assigned to a
location. Social perception is not normally compared
directly to sensory perception, but in this manner they
are similar. They both involve computed properties––
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mental properties or sensory properties—as well as a
computed location, bound together to form a model of
an object.
In this hypothesis, one’s own consciousness is a
perceptual model in which computed properties are
attributed to a location inside one’s body. In this
sense, consciousness is another example of some-
sthesis, albeit a highly specialized one. It is a perceptual
representation of the workings of the inner environ-
ment. Like the perception of a stomach ache, or the
perception of joint rotation, or the perception of light-
headedness, or the perception of cold and hot, the
perception of one’s own awareness is a means of mon-
itoring processes inside the body.
A central philosophical question of consciousness
could be put this way: Why does thinking feel like
something? When Abel solves a math problem in his
head, why doesn’t he merely process the numerical
information and output the number without feeling it?
Why does he feel as though a process is occurring
inside his head? To rephrase the question more pre-
cisely: Why is it that, on introspection, when he
engages a decision process to compare thinking to
somatosensory processing, he consistently concludes
that a similarity exists? We speculate that a part of the
answer may be that his awareness of his own thinking
is a model of the internal environment, assigned to a
location inside his body, and as such is a type of body
perception. He therefore reports that thinking shares
associations with processing in the somatosensory
domain.
Consider again the illusion diagramed in Figure 2,
the feeling that somebody is looking at you from
behind. Subjectively, you feel something on the back
of your neck or in your mind that seems to warn you.
You feel the presence of awareness. But it is not your
own awareness. It is a perceptual model of someone
else’s awareness. How can the feeling be explained?
The perceptual model includes a property (awareness)
and two spatial locations (the source of the awareness
behind you and the focus of the awareness on you).
One of these spatial locations overlaps with your self-
boundary. It “feels” like something in the sense that a
property is assigned to a location inside you. It literally
belongs to the category of somesthesis because it is a
perceptual reconstruction of the internal environment.
What is key here is not merely localizing the event to
the inside of the body, but the rich informational asso-
ciations that come with that localization, the associa-
tions with other forms of somesthesis including touch,
temperature, pressure, and so on. In this speculation,
the perceptual representation of someone else’s atten-
tion on the back of one’s head comes with a vast
shadowy complex of information that is linked to it
and is subtly activated along with it.
In addition to the circumstance of “feeling” some-
one else’s awareness directed at you, consider the
opposite circumstance in which your own awareness
is directed at something else. Do you “feel” your own
awareness of the item? In the present hypothesis, your
machinery for social perception constructs a model of
your own attentional processes. That self-model
includes the property of awareness, a source of the
awareness inside you, and a focus of the awareness
on the object. One of these spatial locations overlaps
with your self-boundary. On introspection, you can
decide that you “feel” the source of your own aware-
ness, in the sense that it is a perceptual model of your
internal environment and therefore shares rich informa-
tional associations with other forms of somesthesis.
In summary, we speculate that even though con-
scious experience is information computed by expert
systems, much like the information in a calculator or a
computer, it nonetheless can “feel” like something in at
least the following specific sense: A decision process,
accessing the self-model, arrives at the conclusion and
triggers the report that awareness shares associations
with somesthesis. This account, of course, does not
explain conscious experience in its entirety; but it
helps to make a central point of the present perspective.
‘Experienceness’ itself may be a complex weaving
together of information, and it is possible to tease
apart at least some of that information (such as the
similarity to somesthesis) and understand how it
might be computed.
CHALLENGE 2: HOW CAN THE
MACHINERY FOR SOCIAL
PERCEPTION GAIN ACCESS TO
MODALITY-SPANNING INFORMATION?
Social perception presents a challenge to neuronal
representation. In color perception, one can study the
areas of the brain that receive color information. In
auditory perception, one can study auditory cortex.
But in social perception, a vast range of information
must converge. Is the other person aware of that coffee
cup? Is he aware of the chill in the room? Is he aware of
the abstract idea that I am trying to get across, or is he
distracted by his own thoughts? What emotion is he
feeling? Social perception requires an extraordinary,
multimodal linkage of information. All things sensory,
emotional, or cognitive that might affect another per-
son’s behavior must be brought together and consid-
ered, in order to build a useful predictive model of the
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other person’s mind. Hence, the neuronal machinery
for social perception must be an information nexus. It is
implausible to talk about a specific region of the brain
that performs all of social perception. If the TPJ and
STS play a central role, which seems likely on the
evidence reviewed above, they must serve as nodes in
a brain-wide network.
In the present hypothesis, awareness is part of a
social perceptual model of one’s own mind. Consider
the case in which you report, “I am aware of the green
apple.”Which part of this linked bundle of information
is encoded in the social machinery, perhaps including
the TPJ or STS, and which is encoded elsewhere in the
brain? Can the TPJ or STS contain a complete, unified
representation of the awareness of green apples? Or,
instead, does the social circuitry compute the “aware-
ness” construct, and the visual cortex represent the
“green apple,” while a binding process links the two
neuronal representations? On sheer speculation, the
second possibility seems more likely. Certainly, the
importance to consciousness of binding information
across wide regions of the brain has been discussed
before (e.g., Baars, 1983; Crick & Koch, 1990;
Damasio, 1990; Engel & Singer, 2001; Grossberg,
1999; Lamme, 2006; Llinas & Ribary, 1994;
Newman & Baars, 1993; Treisman, 1988; von der
Malsburg, 1997). From the perspective of information
theory, it has been suggested that consciousness is
massively linked information (Tononi, 2008; Tononi
& Edelman, 1998). The contribution of the present
hypothesis is to suggest that binding of information
across cortical areas is not, by itself, the raw material
of awareness, but instead awareness is specific infor-
mation, a construct about the nature of experience, that
is computed by and represented in specific circuitry
and that can be bound to larger, network-spanning
representations.
In Treisman’s feature integration theory (Treisman &
Gelade, 1980), when we perceive an object, different
informational features, such as shape, color, and motion,
are bound together to form a unified representation. That
binding requires attention. Without attention to the
object, binding of disparate information about the object
is possible but incomplete and often in error. If aware-
ness acts like a feature that can be bound to an object
representation, then attention to an object should be
necessary for consistent or robust awareness to be
attached to the object. In contrast, awareness of an object
should not be necessary for attention to the object. In
other words, it should be possible to attend to an object
without awareness of it, but difficult to be aware of an
object without attention to it. This pattern broadly
matches the literature on the relationship between atten-
tion and awareness (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2006; Jiang
et al., 2006; Kentridge et al., 2004; Koch & Tsuchiya,
2007; Lamme, 2004; Naccache et al., 2002).
Koch and Tsuchiya (2007) argued that, qualita-
tively, it seems possible to be aware of stimuli at the
periphery of attention, and therefore awareness must be
possible with minimal attention. But note that, in this
circumstance, speaking qualitatively again, one tends
to feel aware of something without knowing exactly
what the something is. Consider the proverbial intui-
tion that something’s wrong, or something’s present, or
something is intruding into awareness at the edge of
vision, without being able to put your finger on what
that item is exactly. This feeling could be described as
awareness that is not fully or reliably bound to a spe-
cific item. Only on redirecting attention does one
become reliably aware of the item. In this sense, aware-
ness acts precisely like the unreliable or false conjunc-
tions occurring outside the focus of awareness in
feature integration theory. It acts like computed infor-
mation about an object, such as a feature that, without
attention, is not reliably bound to the object
representation.
In the present hypothesis, therefore, the relationship
between attention and awareness is rather complex.
Not only is awareness a perceptual reconstruction of
attention, but also to bind awareness to a stimulus
representation requires attention, because attention par-
ticipates in the mechanism of binding.
CHALLENGE 3: IS THE PRESENT
HYPOTHESIS COMPATIBLE WITH
SIMULATION THEORY?
In the present hypothesis, the human brain evolved
mechanisms for social perception, a type of perception
that allows for predictive modeling of the behavior of
complex, brain-controlled agents. There is no assump-
tion here about whether perception of others or percep-
tion of oneself emerged first. Presumably they evolved
at the same time. Whether social perception is applied
to oneself or to someone else, it serves the adaptive
function of a prediction engine for human behavior.
An alternative view is that awareness emerged in the
human brain for reasons unknown, perhaps as an epi-
phenomenon of brain complexity. Social perception
was then possible by the use of empathy. We under-
stand other people’s minds by comparison to our own
inner experience. This second view has the disadvan-
tage that it does not provide any explanation of what
exactly awareness is or why it might have evolved. It
merely postulates that it exists. These two potential
views of consciousness have their counterparts in the
literature on social perception.
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There are presently two main rival views of social
perception. The first view, reviewed in the sections
above, is that social perception depends on expert
systems probably focused on the right TPJ and STS
that evolved to compute useful, predictive models of
minds. The second view is simulation theory. In simu-
lation theory, social perception is the result of empathy.
We understand other people’s minds by reference to
our own internal experience. The hypothesis about
consciousness proposed here was discussed above
almost entirely in the framework of the “expert sys-
tems” view of social perception. Can the hypothesis be
brought into some compatibility with simulation the-
ory? The present section argues that the expert systems
view and simulation theory are not mutually exclusive
and could, at least in principle, operate cooperatively to
allow for social perception. The hybrid of the two
mechanisms is consistent with the present hypothesis
about consciousness.
The experimental heart of simulation theory is the
phenomenon of mirror neurons. Rizzolatti and collea-
gues first described mirror neurons in the premotor
cortex of macaque monkeys, in a region thought to be
involved in the control of the hand for grasping (di
Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti,
1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996;
Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). Each
mirror neuron became active during a particular, com-
plex type of grasp such as a precision grip or a power
grip. The neuron also became active when the monkey
viewed an experimenter performing the same type of
grip. Mirror neurons were therefore both motor and
sensory. They responded whether the monkey per-
formed or saw a particular action.
Mirror-like properties were reported in the human
cortex in fMRI experiments in which the same area of
cortex became active whether the subject performed
or saw a particular action (Buccino et al., 2001;
Filimon, Nelson, Hagler, & Sereno, 2007; Iacoboni
et al., 2005). The hypothesized mirror-neuron net-
work includes sensory-motor areas of the parietal
lobe, anatomically connected regions of the premotor
cortex, and perhaps regions of the STS (Rizzolatti &
Sinigaglia, 2010).
The hypothesized role of mirror neurons is to aid in
understanding the actions of others. In that hypothesis,
we understand someone’s hand actions by activating our
own motor machinery and covertly simulating the
actions. The mirror-neuron hypothesis is in some ways
an elaboration of Liberman’s original hypothesis
about speech comprehension (Liberman, Cooper,
Shankweiler, & Studdert-Kennedy, 1967), in which we
categorize speech sounds by using our own motor
machinery to covertly mimic the same sounds.
The concept of mirroring can in principle be gen-
eralized beyond the perception of other people’s hand
actions to all social perception. We may understand
someone else’s joy, complete with nuances and psy-
chological implications, by using our own emotional
machinery to simulate that joy. We may understand
someone else’s intellectual point of view by activating
a version of that point of view in our own brains. We
may understand other minds in general by simulating
them with the same machinery in our own brains. The
extent to which mirror neurons directly cause social
perception, however, or are a product of more general
associative or predictive mechanisms, has been the
subject of some discussion (e.g., Heyes, 2010; Kilner,
Friston, & Frith, 2007).
One difficulty facing simulation theory is that it
does not provide any obvious way to distinguish
one’s own thoughts, intentions, and emotions from
someone else’s. Both are run on the same hardware.
If simulation theory is strictly true, then one should be
unable to tell the difference between one’s own inner
experience and one’s perception of someone else’s.
A second difficulty facing simulation theory is that
it contains some circularity. Before brain A can mirror
the state of brain B, it needs to know what state to
mirror. brain A needs a mechanism that generates
hypotheses about the state of brain B.
Both of these difficulties with simulation theory
disappear in a hybrid system proposed here. The sys-
tem diagramed in Figure 3 contains expert systems
(including the TPJ and STS) that contribute to generat-
ing models of other minds, and mirror-neuron net-
works that simulate and thereby refine those models.
As discussed in previous sections, a perceptual
model of a mind includes a spatial location assigned
to the model. It is true perception in the sense that the
perceived properties have a perceived location, to form
a perceived object. This spatial embodiment allows one
to keep track of whether it is a model of one’s own
mind or of this or that other person’s mind, solving the
first difficulty of simulation theory. You know whether
the perceived mental states are yours or someone else’s
in the same way that you know whether a certain color
belongs to one object or another—by a spatial tag.
A perceptual model of a mind can also supply the
necessary information to drive the mirror-neuron simu-
lations. The mirror-neuron system, in this proposal,
knows to simulate a reach because the biological
motion detectors in the STS have used visual cues to
categorize the other person’s action as a reach. This
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process solves the second difficulty of simulation the-
ory. The likely dependence of mirror neurons on an
interaction with the STS has been emphasized before
(Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010).
Mirror neurons therefore should not be viewed as
rivals to the theory that social perception is emphasized
in specialized regions such as the TPJ and
STS. Instead, the twomechanisms for social perception
could in principle operate in a cooperative fashion.
Areas such as the TPJ and STS could generate hypoth-
eses about the mind states and intentions of others.
Mirror neurons could then use these generated hypoth-
eses to drive simulations. The simulations have the
potential to provide a detailed, high-quality feedback,
resulting in a more elaborate, more accurate model of
the other mind. In this proposed scheme (Figure 3), the
mirror neuron system is an extended loop adding to and
enhancing the machinery that constructs models of
minds.
Think how much more complicated, in a recursive,
loop-the-loop way, the system becomes when the pro-
cess of social perception is turned inward. Suppose
your self-model includes the hypothesis that you are
happy right now. To enhance that hypothesis, to enrich
the details through simulation, the machinery that con-
structs your self-model contacts and uses your
emotion-generating machinery. In that case, if you
were not actually happy, the mirroring process should
make you become so as a side product. If you were
already happy, perhaps you become more so. Your self-
model and the self that is being modeled become
intertwined in complicated ways. Perceiving your
own mind changes the thing being perceived, a phe-
nomenon long known to psychologists (Bandura,
2001; Beauregard, 2007).
CONSCIOUSNESS AS INFORMATION
Figure 4 diagrams a traditional way to conceptualize
the problem of consciousness. When information is
processed in the brain in some specific but as yet
undetermined way (Box 1), a subjective experience
emerges (Box 2).
For example, imagine that you are looking at a green
apple. Your visual system computes information about
the absorption spectrum of the apple. The presence of
this wavelength information in the brain can be mea-
sured directly by inserting electrodes into visual areas
such as cortical area V4. As a result of that information,
for unknown reasons, you have a conscious experience
of greenness. We could say that two items are relevant
to the discussion: the computation that the apple is
green (Box 1 in Figure 4), and the “experienceness”
of the green (Box 2).
In a religious or spiritual view, the “experience-
ness,” the consciousness itself, is a nonphysical sub-
stance, something like plasma. It is ectoplasm. It is
spirit. In New Age thinking, it is energy or life force.
In traditional Chinese medicine, it is chi. On introspec-
tion, people describe it as a feeling, a sense, an experi-
ence, a vividness, a private awareness hovering inside
Neuronal processing
Arrow  A Arrow  B
of  information
Box 1
Consciousness
Box 2
Figure 4. A traditional view in which consciousness emerges from
the information processed in the brain. Consideration of Arrow A,
how the brain creates consciousness, leads to much controversy and
little insight. Consideration of Arrow B, how consciousness affects
the brain, leads to the inference that consciousness must be informa-
tion, because only information can act as grist for decisionmachinery,
and we can decide that we have consciousness.
TPJ
STS
MPFC
Mirror-Neuron
Systems
Figure 3. A proposed scheme that integrates simulation theory
with the theory of dedicated cortical areas for social cognition. The
box labeled “TPJ, STS” represents a cluster of cortical areas that
contributes to building perceptual models of minds, including a self-
model and models of other minds. The box labeled “MPFC” repre-
sents a prefrontal area that contributes to decisions in the social
domain. The box labeled “Mirror-Neuron Systems” represents
brain-wide networks that simulate and thereby refine the models of
minds generated in TPJ and STS.
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the body. In the view of Descartes (1984 [1641]), it is
res cogitans or “mental substance.” In the view of the
eighteenth-century physician Mesmer and the many
practitioners who subscribed to his ideas for more
than a century, it is a special force of nature called
animal magnetism (Alvarado, 2009). In the view of
Kant (1966 [1781]), it is fundamentally not under-
standable. In the view of Searle (2007), it is like the
liquidity of water; it is a state of a thing, not a physical
thing. According to many scientists, whatever it is, and
however it is caused, it can only happen to information
that has entered into a complex, bound unit (Baars,
1983; Crick & Koch, 1990; Engel & Singer, 2001;
Tononi, 2008).
Arrow A in Figure 4 represents the process by
which the brain generates consciousness. Arrow A is
the central mystery to which scientists of conscious-
ness have addressed themselves, with no definite
answer or common agreement. It is exceedingly diffi-
cult to figure out how a physical machine could pro-
duce a nonphysical feeling. Our inability to conceive of
a route from physical process to mental experience is
the reason for the persistent tradition of pessimism in
the study of consciousness. When Descartes (1984
[1641]) claims that res extensa (physical substance)
can never be used to construct res cogitans (mental
substance), when Kant (1966 [1781]) indicates that
consciousness can never be understood by reason,
when Creutzfeldt (1987) argues that science cannot
give an explanation to consciousness, and when
Chalmers (1995) euphemistically calls it the “hard
problem,” all of these pessimistic views derive from
the sheer human inability to imagine how any Arrow A
could possibly get from Box 1 to Box 2.
It is instructive, however, to focus instead on Arrow
B, a process that is underemphasized both scientifically
and philosophically. Arrow B represents the process by
which consciousness can impact the information-
processing systems of the brain, allowing people to
report on the presence of consciousness. We suggest
that much more can be learned about consciousness by
considering Arrow B than by considering Arrow A. By
asking what, specifically, consciousness can do in the
world, what it can affect, what it can cause, one gains
the leverage of objectivity.
Whatever consciousness is, it can ultimately affect
speech, since we can talk about it. Here some clarifica-
tion is useful. Much of the work on consciousness has
focused on the information of which one becomes
conscious. You can report that you are conscious of
this or that. But you can also report on the conscious-
ness itself. You can state confidently that you have an
inner feeling, an essence, an awareness, that is attached
to this or that item. The essence itself can be reported. If
it can be reported, then one must have decided that it is
present.
Consider the process of decision-making.
Philosophers and scientists of consciousness are used
to asking, “What is consciousness?” A more precisely
formulated question, relevant to the data that are given
to us, would be, “How is it that, on introspection, we
consistently decide that we are conscious?” All studies
of consciousness, whether philosophical pondering,
casual introspection, or formal experiment, depend on
a signal-detection and decision-making paradigm. A
person answers the question, “Is awareness of X pre-
sent inside me?” Note that the question is not, “Is X
present,” or, “Is information about X present,” but
rather, “Is awareness present?”
Much has been learned recently about the neuronal
basis of decision-making, especially in the case of
perceptual decisions about visual motion (for review,
see Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Sugrue, Corrado, &
Newsome, 2005). The decision about visual motion
depends on two processes. First, perceptual machinery
in the visual system constructs signals that represent
motion in particular directions. Second, those signals
are received elsewhere in the brain by decision inte-
grators that determine which motion signal is consis-
tent or strong enough to cross a threshold such that a
response can be triggered.
Translating the same framework to a decision about
awareness, one is led to the following hypothesis.
Answering whether you contain awareness depends
on at least two processes. First, neuronal machinery
(in the present proposal, social perceptual machinery
with an emphasis in the right STS and TPJ) generates
explicit neuronal signals that represent awareness.
Second, a decision process (perhaps in the MPFC)
receives and integrates the signals to assess whether
the property of awareness is present at a strength above
the decision threshold.
The realization that conscious report depends on
decision-making provides enormous leverage in under-
standing what, exactly, awareness is. Everything that is
known about decision-making in the brain points to
awareness as explicitly generated neuronal signals that
are received by a decision integrator. A similar point
has been made with respect to reportable sensory
experience by Romo and colleagues (de Lafuente &
Romo, 2005; Hernandez et al., 2010).
A crucial property of decision-making is that, not
only is the decision itself a manipulation of data but
also the decision machine depends on data as input. It
does not take any other input. Feeding in some res
cogitans does not work on this machine. Neither will
112 GRAZIANO AND KASTNER
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
PF
L 
Bi
bli
oth
èq
ue
] a
t 0
2:1
4 2
3 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
1 
chi. You cannot feed it ectoplasm. You cannot feed it an
intangible, ineffable, indescribable thing. You cannot
feed it an emergent property that transcends informa-
tion. You can only feed it information. In introspecting,
in asking yourself whether you have conscious experi-
ence, and in making the decision that, yes, you have it,
what you are deciding on, what you are assessing, the
actual stuff your decision engine is collecting and
weighing, is information. The experienceness itself,
the consciousness, the subjective feeling, the essence
of awareness that you decide you have, must be infor-
mation that is generated somewhere in the brain, and
that is transmitted to a decision integrator. By consider-
ing Arrow B and working backward, we arrive at a
conclusion: Consciousness must be information,
because only information can be grist for a decision
and we can decide that we have consciousness.
One might pose a counter-argument. Suppose con-
sciousness is an emergent property of the brain that is
not itself information; but it can affect the processing in
the brain, and therefore information about it can be
neuronally encoded. We have cognitive access to that
information, and therefore ultimately the ability to
report on the presence of consciousness. What is
wrong with this account? In the theory presented
here, nothing is wrong with this account. Indeed, it
exactly matches the present proposal except in its
labeling. In the present theory, the brain does contain
an emergent property that is not itself an informational
representation. That property is attention. The brain
also does contain an informational representation of
that property. We can cognitively access that informa-
tional representation, thereby allowing us to decide that
we have it and report that we have it. However, the item
that we introspectively decide that we have and report
that we have is not attention; strictly speaking, it is the
informational representation of attention. In circum-
stances when the informational representation differs
from the thing it represents, we necessarily report the
properties of the representation, because it is that to
which we have access. The mysterious and semi-
magical properties that we report, that we ascribe to
consciousness, must be attributed to the informational
representation.
As an analogy, consider an ordinary book that con-
tains, printed in it, the words, “This is not a book. It is
really a fire-breathing dragon.” Some readers might
announce the presence of a metaphysical mystery. “It
seems to be made of simple material in its outer man-
ifestation,” they might say, “but in its inner manifesta-
tion, it is something else. How can it be a book and a
dragon at the same time? How can we resolve the
dualistic mystery between res libris and res dragonis?”
The resolution is simple. It is a book. The book
contains information on itself. That information is
inaccurate.
In the same way, humans have strong intuitions
about consciousness, awareness, soul, mind. We look
introspectively; that is to say, we consult the informa-
tion present in the brain that describes its own nature,
and we arrive at an intuitive understanding in which
awareness is a nonphysical thing, something like
energy or plasma, that has a location vaguely inside
the body but no clear physical substance, that feels like
something, that is vivid in some cases and less vivid in
other cases, that is a private essence, that is experience,
that seizes on information. What we are doing, when
introspecting in this way, is reading the information in
the book. That information is not literally, physically
accurate. In the present hypothesis, it is a useful infor-
mational representation, a depiction of the real physical
process of attention. Attention is something the brain
does, not something it knows. It is procedural and not
declarative. Awareness, in the present hypothesis, is
declarative. It is an informational representation that
depicts, usefully if not entirely accurately, the process
of attention.
We end with one final analogy. Recall Magritte’s
famous painting of a pipe with the words scrawled
beneath it, “Ceci n’est pas une pipe.” This is not a
pipe. It is a representation of a pipe, an existentially
deep realization. A distinction exists between a repre-
sentation and the thing being represented. In the pre-
sent proposal, consciousness is a representation of
attention. But the representation has taken on a life of
its own. As we examine it cognitively, abstract proper-
ties from it, and verbalize those properties, we find that
the representation depicts magic, spirit, soul, inner
essence. Since we cannot imagine how those things
can be produced physically, we are left with a conun-
drum. How does the brain produce consciousness? Yet
the brain can easily construct information, and infor-
mation can depict anything, even things that are
physically impossible.
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Commentaries
Mirror-touch synaesthesia:
A case of faulty self-modelling
and insula abnormality
Michael J. Banissy1, Vincent Z. Walsh1, and
Neil G. Muggleton1,2
1UCL Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, London,
UK
2Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, National
Central University, Jhongli, Taiwan
E-mail: m.banissy@ucl.ac.uk
DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2011.585232
Abstract: This commentary describes an additional
line of evidence related to the suggestion that
mechanisms of social perception facilitate the
development of a perceptual model of one’s own
mind. Drawing on findings from mirror-touch
synaesthesia, we highlight the importance of the insula
in distinguishing between the perceptions of one’s
own experience versus someone else’s.
In their discussion of the relationship between human
consciousness and mechanisms of social perception,
Graziano and Kastner provide a number of interesting
proposals about how mechanisms of social perception
may act to facilitate an understanding of one’s own
awareness. Their main assertion that, through the alloca-
tion of attention we perceive someone else’s awareness in
the same way that we perceive our own, is thoughtfully
considered and a number of intriguing lines of evidence
are provided to support this argument. One aspect of their
proposal that caught our interest was their prediction that
the neural mechanisms for social perception should con-
struct a self-model (Prediction 3). Here, we consider
additional relevant work related to this proposition by
considering evidence from mirror-touch synaesthesia
and discuss the potential role of the insula in distinguish-
ing between one’s own and another’s awareness.
Mirror-touch synaesthetes experience a conscious
tactile sensation on their own body when simply obser-
ving touch to another persons’ body (Blakemore et al.,
2005). These experiences are thought to occur because
of heightened neural activity in the same network of
brain regions that are active when we observe touch to
another person. This network includes the primary and
secondary somatosensory cortices (SI; SII), premotor
cortex, and the temporo-parietal junction. This mirror-
touch system therefore shows an overlap with the same
regions of the brain as when we are physically touched
(i.e. SI; SII) and has been linked more widely to our
social perception abilities (Banissy & Ward, 2007;
Banissy et al., 2011; Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010).
In the context of mechanisms of social perception
constructing a self-model, mirror-touch synaesthesia
provides a unique experimental preparation to consider
how our perception of others is intrinsically linked to
the self because these synaesthetes activate the same
affective neural system that we all do when perceiving
another’s tactile experience, yet have an additional
tactile experience on their own body. The condition
may therefore be useful in providing insights into
how neural mechanisms of social perception can be
modulated to construct a self-model.
We have previously suggested that mirror-touch
synaesthesia is related to a misrepresentation of
another’s body onto the synaesthete’s own body
schema (Banissy et al., 2009). Extending this to
Graziano and Kastner’s argument, one may suggest
that the condition reflects an error in constructing a
perceptual model of the source of another’s tactile
awareness. Moreover, consistent with the authors’
account of out-of-body-experiences reflecting a spatial
mislocalization of the source one’s awareness, it is
possible that in mirror-touch synaesthesia an error in
the neural systems distinguishing between self and
other leads to the source of another persons’ tactile
awareness being mislocated onto the synaesthetes’
own body.
In this context, it is interesting to note that the only
brain region shown to differ between mirror-touch
synaesthesia and non-synaesthetes when observing
touch to others is the anterior insula (Blakemore
et al., 2005). This region has been related to self-
awareness (Critichley et al., 2004) and processing
one’s awareness of others (Craig, 2004; Lamm &
Singer, 2010). The amount of neural activity within
the insula has also been shown to increase by directing
attention to one’s own emotions when viewing affec-
tive stimuli (Straube & Miltner, 2011). The role of the
insular cortex is overlooked in the current article, but it
is likely to be a particularly important component for
constructing a self-model from mechanisms of social
perception and at least a potential candidate region
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involved in modulating distinctions between the
sources of one’s own or another’s tactile awareness
within the mirror-touch system.
* * *
Functions of consciousness
Bruce Bridgeman
Dept. of Psychology, University of California, Santa
Cruz, CA, USA
E-mail: bruceb@ucsc.edu
DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2011.585228
Abstract: Evolutionary theory indicates that
consciousness has a function, if it is complex enough
to be supported by genetically guided brain structures.
Otherwise there would be no selective pressure against
degrading it. Hints about its function come from word
priming studies, where conscious awareness of a
prime allows it to be avoided according to instructions.
Consciousness, then, allows behavior to be driven by
internal plans rather than primed contingencies from
the momentary environment. Since consciousness is
normally tested by memory of events, its mechanism
may be a form of working memory.
Graziano and Kastner begin their brilliant analysis of
consciousness by asking whether it performs some
function that is beneficial to survival, or is just an
inevitable by-product of a large, complex brain. The
by-product argument doesn’t get far – it would predict
that any large complex information processing device
should be conscious, such as the internet or the network
of telephone landlines. Clearly, size alone doesn’t sup-
port consciousness.
Evolutionary theory indicates that consciousness
does have a function. The argument requires only the
assumption that consciousness be something complex,
instantiated in a brain organization guided by many
genes. It isn’t something developmentally incidental,
such as the navel.
Since consciousness is culturally universal, we can
infer that it is supported by genetically influenced brain
mechanisms. The corresponding genes must have been
selected for during human evolution and are presently
maintained by evolutionary selection. Most of the
influence of natural selection is not to foster change,
but to enforce retention of advantageous adaptations.
Because brain tissue is energetically expensive the
machinery of consciousness would be selected against
if it bestowed no benefit. An analogous process is more
visible in organisms such as fish that become trapped in
caves, living generation after generation in darkness.
Released from the natural selection that normally
maintains the structure of their eyes, these fish gradu-
ally evolve to become blind. The fact that we retain the
capability for consciousness indicates that natural
selection is maintaining it in us; it has a function.
Evolutionary theory, though, does not tell us what
that function is.
The idea that self-consciousness arose from
mechanisms that evolved to assess the intentions of
others is compelling and convincing. Once it appeared,
there is evidence that the conscious mode of brain
function facilitated other functions as well, functions
that enhance the ability to plan sequences of actions
and to execute those plans driven by an internal struc-
ture rather than by the vicissitudes of the sensory envir-
onment of the moment.
An empirical example reveals the advantages of
such a mechanism. Priming can be used as a probe by
giving a person a word stem, such as fi___, and asking
the observer to generate a 5-letter word with that stem,
such as ‘final’ or ‘fists’. Now the observer is briefly
exposed to target words, with each target word fol-
lowed immediately by its stem (Merikle, Joordens &
Stolz, 1995).
Instructed to complete the stem with a word other
than the target word, observers sometimes correctly
generated an alternative stem completion and at other
times incorrectly blurted out the target word. If they
were shown the target word for a relatively long time,
such as a quarter of a second, they usually saw it and
were able to complete the task successfully. After a
shorter exposure, however, such as 50 msec, they often
were unable to report the word, and were more likely to
produce the target word than to choose another one. In
fact, they picked the target word more often than would
be expected at random. Picking that word indicates that
information about it had entered the nervous system.
Without a consciousness of that event, however, the
observers were unable to prevent it from affecting their
behavior as instructed.
One function of consciousness, then, is to prevent
behavior from bending to the momentary availability
of information in the environment. It allows behavior
to be driven by one’s own plans, escaping the tyranny
of the environment. This and similar experiments
lead to the conclusion that consciousness enables
internal plans to overcome environmental nudges
(Bridgeman, 2003, pp. 276–280). This line of evidence
points to consciousness as important in cognitive pro-
cesses. Though there is a convincing case for origins of
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consciousness in the ability to infer the mental states of
others, the cognitive advantages that consciousness
affords extend beyond social- and self-perception.
A corollary of the social origin of consciousness is
that other animals should also have it in some form. If an
animal can predict what a conspecific will do based on
inferring its moods and motivations, all of the cognitive
machinery that Graziano and Kastner specify will func-
tion. A tragic counterexample for the relationship of
social relationships to consciousnessis is severe autism,
in which people with autism cannot use a theory of mind
to infer the states of others; they seem conscious of
events, but not of the self. In short, there is a mind but
no theory of mind.
Consciousness as arising from perception and inter-
pretation of social interactions can also be applied to
speech, a uniquely conscious and uniqely human beha-
vior. Hearing one’s own speech, originally intended to
communicate with others, allows a recursion where the
speech stream re-enters the brain through auditory
channels originally evolved to interpret the speech of
others. The perceived self-speech can then make
another pass through the brain, and thinking results.
The process can be speeded with internal speech, using
much of the same neurological machinery.
All of these processes also depend on memory,
which is the normal test for conscious awareness. A
teacher asking “Johnny, what did I just say?” is using a
memory test for consciousness. A drunk might remem-
ber nothing of the night before. Was he conscious of
those events? This leads to the idea that the mechanism
of consciousness is a particular form of working mem-
ory, no more and no less.
* * *
Should damage to the machinery
of social perception damage
perception?
Peter Carruthers and Vincent Picciuto
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
E-mail: pcarruth@umd.edu
DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2011.585229
Abstract: We argue that Graziano and Kastner are
mistaken to claim that neglect favors their self-directed
social perception account of consciousness. For the
latter should not predict that neglect would result from
damage to mechanisms of social perception. Neglect is
better explained in terms of damage to attentional
mechanisms.
We are sympathetic to the main thesis defended by
Graziano and Kastner (hereafter “G&K”). This is that
phenomenal consciousness results when self-directed
social perception binds a metarepresentational concept
of awareness into the contents of globally broadcast,
widely integrated, perceptual states. This view is quite
close to that developed previously by some philosophers
(Van Gulick, 2004; Kriegel, 2009; Picciuto, 2011).
These are described as “self-representational” theories
of consciousness because the resulting perceptual states
present themselves to us (via the embedded meta-
representational concepts) while also representing
some aspect of the world. In addition to developing
such an account within a neuroscientific framework,
what G&K add is that the self-presenting perceptual
state must also include a representation of the subject’s
own body and its location and orientation in space.
This strikes us as a useful addition. However, they
also provide neuroscientific arguments in support of
their thesis. Some of these we find much less convin-
cing. We will focus on neglect.
G&K point out that some patients with hemispatial
neglect have suffered damage to right TJP and/or right
STS, which are regions crucially implicated in the social
cognition network. These patients seem unaware of
stimuli in their left visual fields, as measured by failure
to cross out lines in a line-crossing visual task. This
finding is said to support the theory of conscious aware-
ness under consideration. We disagree. The findings are
more plausibly explained by damage to aspects of first-
order (but top–down) attentional systems. These happen
to be located close to brain areas crucially involved in
social cognition (as G&K themselves acknowledge).
What should one predict would happen if the metar-
epresentational awareness-concept that is normally
embedded into globally broadcast perceptual states
was lost through damage to the social cognition sys-
tem? One should not predict that the subject would
become blind. For if attentional systems remain unda-
maged, the more-basic process of global broadcasting
should continue as before, making the contents in
question accessible to decision-making systems
among others. So the subject should still (non-
consciously) perceive stimuli and be capable of acting
on them appropriately (such as crossing out all the lines
on a page), at least when acting spontaneously and
unreflectively. Nor should the result be similar to blind-
sight, with subjects declaring that nothing is present in
the relevant portion of the visual field while neverthe-
less being capable of simple discriminations when
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asked to guess. On the contrary, subjects should be
capable of making first-order reports about the pre-
sence and nature of stimuli in the affected field (at
least, provided the reports are generated swiftly and
spontaneously—perhaps in a task requiring them just
to answer “Yes” as fast as possible if a horizontal line
appears somewhere in their visual field). For if first-
order attentional systems are working normally, the
relevant percepts will be globally broadcast, and
should thus be accessible to inform a verbal report.
What G&K should predict is just that damage to the
social cognition system would result in loss of the
subjective, phenomenal, aspects of the relevant percep-
tual states. This ought to issue in a number of cognitive
or behavioral deficits. In particular, subjects should be
incapable of drawing the is–seems distinction with
respect to stimuli in the affected portion of the visual
field. While subjects should perceive the world, they
should be unable to contrast what is present with what
seems to them to be present, or with what they experi-
ence as being present. For the relevant self-
representing awareness-representation will no longer
be bound into the content of the perceptual states in
question, and hence will not be accessible for report.
Moreover, there should be a dissociation between swift
spontaneous reporting of stimuli and what subjects are
inclined to say on reflection, after noticing that they
lack any appropriate conscious experience.
The only way in which blindness or neglect could
result from damage to self-directed social cognition
would be if the presence of a metarepresentational
awareness-concept were the main determinant of the
global broadcasting—or widespread integration—of
the relevant perceptual representations. But this is
quite implausible. First-order mechanisms of top–
down attention are presumably much more basic than
social cognition, and were determinants of global
broadcasting long before the evolution of mechanisms
for social cognition. They ought therefore to continue
unabated when the latter is damaged.
In conclusion, while we applaud the theoretical
framework that G&K provide, we think that they
over-sell some of the evidence that is said to favor it.
* * *
Consciousness is for sharing
Chris D. Frith
Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging at
University College London, UK, & Center of
Functionally Integrative Neuroscience at Aarhus
University, Denmark
E-mail: c.frith@ucl.ac.uk
DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2011.585230
Abstract: I welcome the idea that consciousness,
rather than being private, has a crucial role in
understanding other minds. However, I believe that the
critical mechanism underlying consciousness is meta-
cognition; the ability to reflect upon and report mental
states, whether our own or those of others. This allows
us to share experiences and create a more accurate
picture of the world.
Graziano & Kastner put forward an ingenious proposal
about the origin of consciousness. This will be counter-
intuitive for some, since, rather than being a private
place for the self, consciousness emerges from the
neural mechanism that permits tracking the attentional
focus of others. The same mechanism is also used to
represent our own attention. G & K suggest that con-
sciousness emerges from this ability to represent our
own attention. In this scheme consciousness is the
meta-cognitive representation of our own awareness.
I must immediately declare a strong bias in favor of
these ideas. Like G & K I believe that, if we want to
understand consciousness we need to ask what it is for
and, like them, my answer is that its fundamental func-
tion is social (Frith, 2008). I also like very much their
novel and innovative idea that the machinery for repre-
senting of the focus of attention is applied to others as
well as to ourselves. A major clue to where others are
focussing their attention comes from eye gaze direction
and humans are very accurate at judging where people
are looking. The human iris, uniquely among primates
(Kobayashi & Kohshima, 1997), is surrounded by white
sclera making it easier to discern eye gaze direction.
Thus, the evolution of this aspect of the human eye
was not directly for the benefit of the individual, but
for the benefit of others. This is confirmatory evidence
for G & K’s suggestions about the social function of
representations of the focus of attention.
However, I am unconvinced about the link with con-
sciousness. People compute the direction of attention of
others, where they are looking and what they see, auto-
matically (Bayliss & Tipper, 2006; Qureshi, Apperly, &
Samson, 2010). I conclude that we can take account of
the attention of others without awareness. Also I don’t
see why G & K’s account necessitates a subjective
component. What does the feeling of being aware add
to our ability to compute what people are attending to?
The problem is to explain the function of this subjective
component.
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I believe we have all been misled by the long-
standing idea that consciousness is private. On the con-
trary, conscious experience is the one outcome of our
brain’s information processing that can be shared with
others. It is this sharing that provides the value of con-
sciousness. By sharing their experiences, two people can
gain a more accurate perception than the best person
working on her own (Bahrami et al., 2010).
On this account the key component of consciousness
is meta-cognition. I agree with G & K that a representa-
tion of our awareness, creating a feeling of being aware,
is fundamentally important. But this meta-cognitive
process can be applied to many things in addition to
attention, including, for example, the feeling of agency.
What we need to uncover is the neural mechanisms
underlyingmeta-cognition. There is currently increasing
interest in meta-cognition with developments in its
empirical study (Lau, 2008) and quantification
(Galvin, Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 2003). Although,
as yet, we know little of relevant neural mechanisms,
the prefrontal cortex is strongly implicated (Del Cul,
Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, & Slachevsky, 2009; Fleming,
Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010).
But this critique of G&K concerns just minor details.
I am very pleased to join them in promoting the idea that
consciousness is not a private place. It has a major role in
enabling the richness of human of social interactions.
* * *
Hybrid social cognitive models,
meta-consciousness, and
representations
Marco Iacoboni
Ahmanson-Lovelace Brain Mapping Center, Dept.
of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences, Semel
Institute for Neuroscience and Human Behavior,
Brain Research Institute, David Geffen School of
Medicine at UCLA, CA, USA
E-mail: iacoboni@ucla.edu
DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2011.585236
Abstract: Hybrid social cognitive models, based not
only on simulation, are desirable, especially in
complex scenarios. It is unclear, however, which
neural systems support non simulative processes.
Furthermore, the proposal that consciousness is a form
of representation of attention, while novel, relies on a
traditional concept of representation. Recent ﬁndings
suggest an ontological priority of representations,
where the representation and the thing being
represented are not distinct at all.
Graziano and Kastner propose a novel model of con-
sciousness, according to which consciousness (or at least
one prominent aspect of it, awareness) is a declarative
process about something else. Indeed, according to their
model, consciousness is a representation of an eminently
procedural phenomenon, the deployment of attention.
This is a rather interesting hypothesis, and deﬁnitely
a novel one. I can’t recall of any existing model of
consciousness in the literature that resembles this one.
This is already a merit, in a quite crowded literature.
My comments will focus on three aspects of the
paper. First, the idea that social cognitive models can
be hybrid or mixed, based on both highly specialized
systems for social perception and simulative processes
supported by forms of neural mirroring. Second, the
idea that our reports, verbal or otherwise, are faithful
measures of what is being reported. Third, the very
notion of representation, the way it has been classically
construed and still is prevalently conceived, and possi-
ble alternative ways of thinking about it based on
recent neurophysiological observations.
It makes sense that ﬂexible social cognition is based
on more than one functional process, and that these
processes interact in some way, as Graziano and
Kastner propose. An exclusively simulative mechan-
ism seems unlikely, especially when complex scenarios
require more than simulation, including cognitive con-
trol, inferential reasoning, etcetera. What is unclear is
the role of some of the structures used by Graziano and
Kastner in Figure 3. While existing data on STS make
it clear that this functional region is anatomically well
deﬁned and functionally linked to perception of biolo-
gical motion, both TPJ and MPFC have been asso-
ciated with a wide variety of processes and tasks.
Furthermore, they are anatomically less well deﬁned.
With regard to MPFC, many imaging studies have also
shown a peculiar pattern of activity with less de-
activation for the ‘experimental’ task and more de-
activation for the control task. This pattern boils down
to less deviation from baseline for the experimental task.
In physiology, what generally is considered the most
meaningful response is the response that deviates from
baseline MORE, not LESS. This interpretive anomaly
for the MPFC pattern has been justiﬁed by the high level
activity of this region at rest. In physiology, however,
baseline activity does not typically affect the interpreta-
tion of the data in this fashion. A neuron with high
baseline ﬁring rate is still considered to respond more
to, say, stimulus A rather than B, when its ﬁring rate is
suppressedMORE for stimulus A than for B. It is unclear
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why the imaging literature is reversing a time honored
tradition of interpreting physiological responses in cases
such as the MPFC. At some point the neuroscience
community will have to face this puzzling anomaly.
The underlying, although left mostly unsaid,
assumption of the manuscript is that subjective reports
are fundamentally correct. Plenty of evidence suggests
otherwise. Humans are not too good at monitoring their
own cognition (Schooler, 2002). While I don’t see this
as a major problem for the model proposed by
Graziano and Kastner, it is something to be considered
when speciﬁc predictions of the model will be tested.
Finally, a comment on the issue of representations.
This is obviously a big issue in cognitive science, and
dates back to Plato. Indeed, since Plato, the dominant
view of representation is the same advocated by
Graziano and Kastner. “A distinction exists betweena
representation and the thing being represented.” The
word itself, re-presentation, embodies this whole con-
cept of representations being both ontologically and
temporally secondary to the things they represent. In
the Graziano and Kastner model, consciousness is a
representation of attention. The very discovery of mirror
neurons, however, suggests that perhaps representations
themselves may not work the way we think they work.
Mirror neurons suggest an almost unsettling ontological
priority of representations, where the representation and
the thing being represented are not distinct at all
(Iacoboni, in press). This is a concept that is difﬁcult to
face, because our idea of representation is so entrenched
in our minds, and is such a foundational aspect of how
we think, that I bet very few are willing to even consider
the possibility of rethinking it. And yet, rethinking it
may make us better equipped at dealing with the
theoretical implications of recent scientiﬁc advances
(Thiagarajan, Lebedev, Nicolelis, & Plenz, 2010).
* * *
Autism and perception of
awareness in self and others:
Two sides of the same coin or
dissociated abilities?
Rogier A. Kievit and Hilde M. Geurts
Faculty of Psychology, University of Amsterdam,
The Netherlands
E-mail: r.a.kievit@uva.nl
DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2011.585233
Abstract: Graziano and Kastner propose a theoretical
framework suggesting that the same cognitive
machinery underlies computation and inferences
concerning (the content of) awareness in others as
underlies the perception of the contents of our own
awareness. We draw from this hypothesis a strong
prediction: Individuals who have deficiencies in one of
these abilities must also be impaired in the other. We
discuss evidence supporting this prediction from the
literature on autism spectrum disorder, but also discuss
tentative evidence for a possible dissociation between
these two abilities. We conclude that these lines of
evidence form crucial empirical tests of the theory.
In their target article, Graziano and Kastner suggest that
the same machinery underlies computation and infer-
ences concerning (the content of) awareness in others as
underlies the perception of the contents of our own
awareness. We take their hypothesis and deduce two
empirical predictions: 1) individuals with deficiencies in
inferring the content of their own mental states should
have deficiencies in perceiving awareness of others and 2)
individuals who have known deficiencies in inferring the
content of awareness in others are probably also impaired
in inferences concerning their own mental states. It there-
fore makes sense to examine cases where this ability goes
awry: People with autism spectrum disorder. Difficulties
in predicting the behavior and (emotional) content of
others are thought to be a central aspect of the social
difficulties seen in people with ASD. If consciousness is
indeed a construct of social perceptual machinery, such
cases offer a critical test of the theory.
Research on ASD has shown well-documented
impairments in inferring mental states of others, in
adults and children (Frith, 2004), known in the litera-
ture as the Theory-of-Mind hypothesis. If the hypoth-
esis in the target article holds, people with ASD should
also have difficulties with self-awareness. Several lines
of evidence suggest that this is indeed the case.
First, severe degrees of alexithymia (difficulties in
experiencing one’s own emotions) have been found to
affect 50% of populations of individuals with ASD,
compared to 10% in the general population (Hill,
Berthoz, & Frith, 2004). Second, Ben Shalom et al.
(2006) showed that children with ASD displayed nor-
mal physiological responses when experiencing emo-
tions, but differed from controls in the conscious report
of these emotions, suggesting a deficit in the conscious
awareness of their emotions. Finally, Silani et al.
(2008) used fMRI to show that self-reported poor
awareness of own and others’ feelings was associated
with decreased activity in the insula. They concluded:
“We hypothesize that the same neural architecture
underlies the conscious representation of emotion in
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the self and in others. We suggest that the insula sub-
serves this function” (p. 106). These findings are in line
with the hypothesis that deficiencies in inferring the
mental state of others co-occurs with difficulties in self-
related perception.
The implications of these findings go beyond sup-
port for the hypothesis of the target article: If accuracy
of self-perception is impaired in individuals with, for
instance, ASD, this means clinicians should be careful
in basing clinical decisions on the content of patients’
self-report, a conclusion supported by recent findings
(Mazefsky, Kao, & Oswald, 2011).
However, that these two abilities are correlated does
not, in itself, prove that they are subserved by the
same machinery. Evidence for a dissociation would go
directly against the claims in the target article, and
require either an alternate explanation or a revision of
the core hypothesis.
For instance, Silani et al. (2008, p. 37) caution
against overgeneralizing their findings: “particular dif-
ficulties in emotional awareness in individuals with
HFA/AS are not related to their impairments in self-
reflection/mentalizing”. Furthermore, Magnée, de
Gelder, Van Engeland, and Kemner (2007, p. 1122)
showed that people with ASD had ‘enhanced sensitiv-
ity to facial cues at the level of reflex-like emotional
responses’. Finally, Bird et al. (2008, p. 1515) show
that the correlation between ASD and deficiencies
in affect sharing is modulated by alexithymia:
“Importantly, there was no difference in the degree of
empathy between autistic and control groups after
accounting for alexithymia.”
To summarize, the hypothesis in the target article
predicts co-occurring deficiencies in perception of self
and others. Literature on ASD tentatively supports this
prediction. However, evidence is equivocal, and the
precise nature of deficiencies should be further studied,
as it provides a critical test of the theory of social
perceptual machinery.
* * *
Not all information is created
equal
Christof Koch
Division of Biology, California Institute of
Technology, Pasadena, CA, USA
E-mail: koch.christof@gmail.com
DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2011.585231
Abstract: Granziano & Kastner’s account of
consciousness as a process based on knowledge of what
others are attending to does explain conscious access to
spatial location. However, it fails to account for
consciousness of the many object attributes that an
external observer cannot infer from the subject’s gaze.
I completely agree with the viewpoint that consciousness
is information. However, it just can not be any type of
information in the Shannon sense (Shannon & Weaver,
1949). For example, my liver enzymes represent a vast
amount of information about metabolites and their end
products circulating in the blood stream; yet I do not have
conscious access to the state of my liver. Nor am I
conscious of the neuronal representations in my retina;
and a plethora of experiments have demonstrated that
subjects can be unaware of millions of neurons in
primary visual cortex firing vigorously to some percep-
tually suppressed stimulus. Crick and Koch (2001)
termed the many rapid sensory-motor behaviors that
function in the absence of consciousness (e.g. typing on
a keyboard; Logan & Crump, 2009) zombie systems.
Where is the informational difference between zombie
and conscious systems?
Rather, one has to distinguish between two types of
information. This is why the Integrated Information
account of Tononi is such an attractive candidate for a
theory of consciousness (Tononi, 2008; Balduzzi &
Tononi, 2008). The same criticism applies when the
authors frame the problem of consciousness as com-
puting the answer to the decision of whether or not I
have an inner experience. Why can I answer in the
affirmative when it comes to the question “what is the
color of that surface patch I’m looking at?” but am not
able to answer the question “what is the pH of the
content of my stomach?” even though the enteric ner-
vous system, with about 100 million neurons, monitors
the acidity of my digestive tract?
I do agree with Graziano and Kastner’s viewpoint
that attention and consciousness/awareness are distinct
processes. Indeed, I have vehemently argued for such a
two-way distinction (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). It
would be interesting to see whether their theory can
explain the remarkable experimental finding that atten-
tion and consciousness can sometimes have opposing
effects (van Boxtel, Tsuchiya, & Koch, 2010).
The authors rightly stress the importance of Abel
knowing where Bill attends to. However, this demand
could be satisfied by a sort of saliency map (Itti & Koch,
2001) that indicates that - at the moment - Bill looks
over there. However, what is missing from this account
is that Abel is not just aware where Bill is attending to
(i.e. spatial location) but that Abel is aware of many of
the attributes of objects at that location. Consciousness
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is replete with detailed content, most of which has
nothing to do with spatial location. Abel can be aware
of the surface texture, orientation and color of the cup,
not just of the fact that Bill is attending to the cup of
there. Interestingly, it is this ability to be conscious of
the content of one’s focus that remains in severe forms
of bilateral neglect. Patients suffering from Balint’s
syndrome (Rafal, 1997) or simultanagnosia (Jackson
et al., 2009) have lost all ability to locate items within
the visual scene but they are still conscious of whatever
is at the center of their gaze.
For some conscious modalities, the need to pinpoint
the spatial focus of attention of an outside observer does
not arise. A strong odor has no particular localization (if
one prevents the subject from moving about), yet one
can be highly conscious of the smell. Diffuse visceral
pain can often only be spatially pinpointed following a
detailed medical examination. Conversely, a tooth ache
can be quite precisely located to within a single tooth,
yet without an external observer having access to infor-
mation that would allow her tomake this sort of accurate
spatial inference. Yet all these states can be consciously
experienced, sometimes painfully so.
So while the social aspects of eye movements may
be able to explain the spatial location of attention and
awareness, such an account fails for a vast swath of
conscious content.
* * *
What is it like to be a human?
David A. Leopold
Unit on Cognitive Neurophysiology and Imaging,
National Institute Mental Health, National Institutes
of Health, Bethesda, MD, USA
E-mail: leopoldd@mail.nih.gov
DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2011.585235
Abstract: The explicit link between awareness and
sociality put forward in the accompanying article
opens new doors to thinking about the evolutionary
origins of consciousness. Human subjective
experience undoubtedly has some features that are
species-specific and others that are shared over a broad
phylogenetic base. The authors’ proposal that
consciousness depends on high-level neural circuits
evolved for social perception begs the question
whether animals lacking such circuitry experience a
fundamentally different form of consciousness from
humans. It also highlights the need for comparative
work elucidating neural mechanisms by which
animals other than primates perceive and respond to
their conspecifics.
The neural basis of consciousness is arguably the most
mysterious scientific puzzle facing us. Human subjective
experience is a product of the brain, yet cannot be neatly
pinned down to a particular neural system or circuit. As
far as we can tell, other animals partake consciously in
the world as we do, albeit sometimes drawing upon very
different perceptual adaptations (Nagel, 1974). This
raises the question of whether consciousness, and the
neural systems that promote it, can be studied in a
comparative and evolutionary context.
The accompanying article focuses almost exclusively
on humans, drawing upon data from nonhuman pri-
mates when necessary. Yet by linking consciousness to
social perception, the proposed framework raises the
possibility that the study of consciousness via compara-
tive social neuroscience can provide valuable new
insights. The article argues that high-level social percep-
tion, turned inwardly, gives rise to conscious awareness.
In other words, human self-awareness draws upon the
same neural computations used to assess the mental
states of others. While this explanation, like most expla-
nations of consciousness, retains a mystical tinge, it does
unambiguously link awareness to neural mechanisms of
social perception. What is meant by awareness? The
authors are clear on this point: it pertains not only to
metacognition or access consciousness, but also to phe-
nomenal consciousness – as they put it, “awareness of
anything, awareness of a color, or a sound, or a smell.”
The notion that social neuroscience can advance our
understanding of consciousness is an optimistic and
welcome view. Let us briefly consider what is known
about social perception in animals. First, major taxa such
as mammals and birds are composed of species that
range from being solitary to highly gregarious. Second,
social complexity is a critical factor in shaping species
intelligence and encephalization (Humphrey, 1976;
Shultz & Dunbar, 2010). Third, behavioral and etholo-
gical testing has shown that socially oriented species
across a range of taxa are capable of monitoring and
interpreting the behaviors of their conspecifics (Byrne&
Bates, 2010; Leopold & Rhodes, 2010). Thus there is
good reason to believe that high-level social perception
is common in the animal world, that its level of expres-
sion varies widely among species, and that it has co-
evolved with measurable changes in the brain.
At the physiological level, we know almost nothing
about neural structures in other animals that may be
homologous to those implicated in human social cogni-
tion such as the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and right
COMMENTARIES 121
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
PF
L 
Bi
bli
oth
èq
ue
] a
t 0
2:1
4 2
3 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
1 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ). This is in some ways
surprising, since comparative research has gleaned con-
siderable information about other, related aspects of
brain function. For example, electrophysiological studies
have revealed detailed, multimodal sensory maps of the
cerebral cortex in diverse mammals (Kaas, 2002).
Comparative work has also identified molecules and
primitive neural circuits that contribute to affiliative
behaviors across a range of vertebrates (Insel, 2010).
Nonetheless, the question of whether high-level social
circuits evolved recently to fit the specific needs of
primate, or possibly human, society, or whether they
shared features of the mammalian brain, is presently a
matter of speculation.
It is worth pointing out that there is one other mam-
malian species whose cortical mechanisms of social
perception have been studied: sheep. Sheep are social
animals that readily recognize faces and interpret facial
expressions of their conspecifics, even when the faces
presented on a computer monitor. Single-unit electro-
physiological recordings have revealed that neurons in
the sheep temporal cortex exhibit selectivity for faces
that bears a striking similarity to that observed in mon-
keys and humans (Tate, Fischer, Leigh, & Kendrick,
2006). While this observation does not imply that
sheep possess a human-like potential for mind reading,
it does at least raise the question whether the sheep
homologs of the human STS and TPJ might be involved
in some form of social monitoring.
Could advances in social neuroscience ultimately
bear on our understanding of the evolution of conscious-
ness? Possibly so – if consciousness and social percep-
tion are indeed fundamentally interlinked. The fact that
we can presently only speculate on the cortical systems
supporting high-level social perception in animals calls
attention to the fact that more work needs to be directed
toward comparative social neuroscience. As we learn
more about the types of neural specializations in differ-
ent animals, we may slowly gain insight into the evolu-
tion of our own social brain, and, if the hypothesis in the
accompanying article is correct, into the neural circuits
that lie at the heart of our conscious experience.
* * *
Stimulus independence, social
cognition and consciousness
Jonathan Smallwood
Department of Social Neuroscience, The Max
Planck Institute for Human and Cognitive Brain
Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
E-mail: jonsmallwood2004@yahoo.com
DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2011.585234
Abstract: A consensus emerging from neuroscience is
that certain brain regions show activity correlated with
stimulus independent (e.g. private) conscious thought
and yet are also implicated in public social processes.
The fact that systems supporting social processing also
exhibit activity with no obvious perceptual referent, can
be seen as support for the framework suggested by
Graziano and Kerber (this volume) once it is recognized
that the property of stimulus independence is also an
important feature of consciousness. Understanding the
social basis behind private stimulus independent thought,
therefore, may provide an important assessment of the
validity of the Graziano and Kerber hypothesis.
The proposal of Graziano and Kastner (this issue)
argues that our phenomenal awareness is a product of
our capacity to understand and represent the mental
states of another individual; a process known as social
cognition (SC). As consciousness pervades our private
waking life, a role of SC in consciousness would imply
that in a fundamental way: I can’t get you out of my
head. While the social basis of consciousness is not
new (e.g. Dennet, 1992), the current hypothesis goes
substantially beyond previous suggestions by implicat-
ing SC in phenomenal awareness (a critical element of
what is known as the hard problem of conscious experi-
ence, Chalmers, 1996). In particular, because social
processes can drive natural selection (e.g. Tomasello,
1999), Graziano and Kastner provide a hypothesis for
how phenomenal awareness could arise through an
evolutionary process.
On the face of it the role of SC in conscious thought
seems to differ from accounts of consciousness that
emphasize processes that are chiefly internal in nature.
For example, in 1995 Francis Crick suggested an
experimental definition of consciousness that empha-
sized that the neural process associated with conscious
experience could be differentiated from those that
represent code the raw features of sensory events.
This astonishing hypothesis made the problem of con-
sciousness experimentally tractable because it made a
testable prediction – those experiences associated con-
sciousness would be neural processes that are relatively
stimulus independent (SI) in nature.
Soon after Crick and colleagues published their thesis
on consciousness, interest in SI neural activity increased
due to a seemingly unrelated observation that a coordi-
nated system of brain regions continue to exhibit activity
when participants are not constrained by an external task.
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Whether this activity constituted a coherent system was
once a matter of debate, however, now the so-called
default mode network (DMN, Raichle, 2001) and the
more general ‘resting state’ is a widely accepted element
of the neuro-science paradigm. Because activity in the
DMN persists in situations when external task processes
are negligible, this system was initially defined by its
capacity to exhibit SI neural activity. In the last few years
studies have gone on to implicate the DMN directly in
the production of the stream of internally generated
thoughts we experience, for example, when we day-
dream (e.g. Mason et al., 2007).
One surprising feature of the DMN is that many of
the structures involved in SI thought are also related to
SC (e.g. mPFC, Mitchell, 2009). Elements of the DMN
system are, for example, active in explicit tasks requir-
ing predicting the decisions of another individual (such
as the prisoners dilemma, e.g. Rilling et al., 2008),
implicated in empathic processes (e.g. Lamm, Decety
& Singer, 2011) and plays a role in estimating another
individuals’ mind (e.g. Gallagher & Frith, 2003;
Spreng & Grady, 2010).
That the tell-tale signs of the DMN are private SI
mentation and public SC seems, on the face of it, a
contradiction. Such an association between the internal
world of the mind and the external world of social
interaction is, however, precisely what would be
expected if consciousness was a social phenomenon
(Frith, 2008). As such the SI activity performed by the
DMN provides an important conceptual link between
the proposal of Graziano and Kastner and the argu-
ments made Crick; however, as the precise processes
that DMN plays remain mysterious, alternative expla-
nations are a definite possibility. First, theories of con-
scious experience known as global workspace models
(e.g. Dehaene, et al., 2006) argue that information only
becomes conscious when it gains access to a general
purpose system that allows information to become
globally available to the system. Based on this logic,
it is important to identify whether global availability is
necessary for the DMN network to lead to conscious SI
experience (Smallwood, 2010).
Second, although Graziano and Kestner argue that
consciousness is produced when I “put yourself in my
place”, other theorists argue that the directionality is
reversed (e.g. “knowing me, knowing you”, Mitchell,
2009). As the Graziano and Kebsters proposal is spe-
cifically uni-directional, experimental paradigms that
explore whether representations of self or others are the
prime movers in the process of simulation are needed
to assess this specific element of the hypothesis in
question.
Third, while the DMN is an important contribution
to the neural process in operation during the resting
state, recent studies have documented many other brain
networks show SI activity when participants are given
no external task to perform (e.g. Smith et al., 2010). It
is unlikely, that all of these systems are directly con-
cerned with conscious thought (e.g. Raichle, 2010) and
so understanding the computations that these other
networks perform at rest is, therefore, necessary before
the links between SI, SC and consciousness are com-
pletely understood.
If the capacity for SI is linked to the processes of SC,
then understanding DMN activity could illuminate the
process of consciousness. Although understanding
consciousness simply in terms of spontaneous brain
activity is a dangerous game, fMRI and other techni-
ques allow the assessment of otherwise unobservable
SI mental activity. If Graziano and Kaster are correct,
rather than being light years away, an understanding of
the enigma of consciousness could well be closer than
either you or I think.
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the primacy of self related
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Abstract: G&K provide a new and interesting
perspective on consciousness, by arguing that
consciousness is a product of social perception. Based
on the overlap between the neural mechanisms
underlying spatial awareness of other people and
oneself, out-of-body experiences (OBEs), and social
perception the authors argue that consciousness is
based on the brain signals that represent other people
and their spatial awareness. Although we generally
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welcome the authors efforts, we (1) would like to
emphasize that consciousness has two distinct spatial
aspects, namely self-location and first-person
perspective, (2) cite evidence about distinct
developmental and brain mechanisms concerning
first- versus third-person perceptions and cogitations
and (3) argue for a primacy of multisensory own body
perception over social perception and awareness as a
neurobiological foundation of consciousness.
Citing experimental data in patients (Blanke, Ortigue,
Landis, & Seeck, 2002) and healthy subjects
(Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007)
G&K highlight the spatial character of consciousness
and link this to OBEs. Consciousness, however, has
two distinct spatial aspects: self-location (SL) and first-
person perspective (1PP; Blanke & Metzinger, 2009).
SL refers to the location where subjects experience
themselves to be (“Where am I in space?”) and 1PP
refers to the perspective and directedness of conscious-
ness (“From where do I perceive the world?”). SL and
1PP are open to experimentation and can be dissociated
in neurological disease, yet G&K only discuss
SL. Thus, whereas most OBEs are characterized by a
spatially congruent SL and 1PP, this is not always the
case and in some cases SL and 1PP can be experienced
at separate spatial positions (De Ridder, Van Laere,
Dupont, Menovsky, & Van de Heyning 2007; see also
Blanke et al., Science E-letter, 2008). Moreover, it was
recently shown that the experienced direction of 1PP
and SL can be manipulated independently (Ionta et al.,
2011). G&K’s proposal does discuss the importance of
the spatial character of consciousness, but we argue
that their consciousness proposal also needs to inte-
grate distinct mechanisms for 1PP and SL.
We further note that several lines of evidence have
shown that during development the ability to take a 1PP
precedes the ability to take a 3PP - defined by some as
having a theory of mind (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Does
a similar lPP-over-3PP primacy also exist for perception
and consciousness? For example, awareness of the bodily
self and associated aspects of 1PP develops early within
the first few months of life (Rochat, 1998), whereas
theory of mind abilities only gradually emerge from the
4th year of life onwards. In addition, neuroimaging studies
in both children and adults suggest that taking a 1PP
versus a 3PP recruits different neural networks (Dosch,
Loenneker, Bucher, Martin, & Klaver, 2010; Kockler
et al., 2010). Together, these findings argue against the
view that self-awareness and consciousness build upon
awareness of other people, that the neural mechanisms
supporting self- and other-awareness can be equated, and
against a primacy of social perception.
A number of studies revealed that consciousness is
based on the integration of visual, tactile, and vestibu-
lar mechanisms. We argue that this multi-sensory inte-
gration of bodily signals is more fundamental and
develops earlier in the human brain than brain repre-
sentations of consciousness of others (Rochat, 1998).
Independent of attention or awareness we have pro-
posed that bodily information accounts for what G&K
refer to as “the inner essence, the feeling of conscious-
ness, that seems to be attached to the information” and
that we have called minimal phenomenal selfhood
(Blanke & Metzinger, 2009). When applied to one of
the examples given by G&K – the feeling of being
stared at (or the feeling of a presence) – we predict
that such experiences are not “built on lower level
sensory cues such as subtle shadows or sounds” and
thus social cues, but rather on multisensory signals
originating from the subject’s own body and processed
in the TPJ/STS region. The controlled induction of the
latter illusion in neurology did indeed reveal that that
different positions and states of the subject’s own body
lead to differently experienced positions and states of
the staring other’s body (Arzy, Seeck, Ortigue,
Spinelli, & Blanke, 2006). These considerations and
empirical human data argue for a primacy of self-
related compared over other-related signals with
respect to awareness and consciousness.
* * *
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Reply to Commentaries
Awareness as a perceptual model of attention
Michael S. A. Graziano and Sabine Kastner
Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
We proposed a theory of consciousness in which the machinery for social perception constructs awareness, and
awareness is a perceptual model of the process of attention. One can attribute awareness to others or to oneself.
Awareness of X is the brain’s perceptual metaphor for the deep attentive processing of X. A set of ten comments on
our hypothesis are included in this issue. Each comment raises specific points some of which directly challenge the
hypothesis. Here we respond to these specific points and challenges.
We thank all the authors who contributed commen-
taries. The many thoughts and criticisms are well
informed, insightful, useful to us, and undoubtedly
interesting to readers. Here we address each of the
commentaries in brief.
Leopold asks an age-old question: what species are
conscious? Few species have a full-blown, human-
like ability for theory of mind. Yet in our hypothesis,
awareness does not depend on social cognition in gen-
eral, but instead on one specific aspect of it, the per-
ceptual reconstruction of attention. In our hypothesis,
any animal that can construct a rich model of another’s
attentional state knows what awareness is; and any
animal that maintains a perceptual model of its own
attentional state is aware. Whether a particular species
has these abilities is an empirical question, but the bar
is lower than for advanced social cognition such as
solving the false belief task. Leopold is correct: our
hypothesis suggests that consciousness is widespread
in the animal kingdom.
Koch is a proponent of the view that consciousness is
related to complex, bound information. He agrees with
some of the points raised in our article. The commen-
tary, however, mainly challenges our theory. We sug-
gest that Koch criticizes the theory for failings that it
does not have.
First, at the start of the commentary, Koch states, “I
completely agree with the viewpoint that conscious-
ness is information. However, it just can’t be any
information in the Shannon sense.” He notes that the
liver contains information but isn’t conscious. Our
article does not suggest that consciousness is any
information such as that found in the liver. Rather we
suggest that it is a specific type of information com-
puted in a specific brain system. The first half of the
commentary therefore elaborates on an irrelevant
criticism.
Second, Koch interprets our theory in an overly
specific manner. He suggests that the theory deals
only in spatial location — in perceiving the spatial
source and spatial target of attention. He states, “what
is completely missing from this account is that Abel is
not just aware where Bill is attending to (i.e. spatial
location) but he is aware of many of the attributes of
objects at that location.” Yet this criticism does not
pertain to our article or our theory. As we point out,
“In the present hypothesis, awareness is the perceptual
reconstruction of attention, and therefore anything that
can be the subject of attention can also be the subject of
awareness.”One can attend to color, to shape, to smell,
to a thought, to a great diversity of items. Spatial
location is a relevant part of the issue; it is one of the
many aspects of attention that must be captured in a
perceptual model of the process of attending to some-
thing; but it is not the entire story.
Carruthers and Picciuto are a proponent of the link
between consciousness and social cognition. He takes a
positive view of our approach. He does raise a specific
point about hemispatial neglect with which we disagree.
Carruthers and Picciuto (C&P) argue that neglect is
not a true deficit of awareness. In neglect, the patient
fails to notice, orient to, or verbally report items in the
affected region of space. Some unconscious processing
such as priming survives. According to C&P, however,
DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2011.585237 REPLY TO COMMENTARIES 125
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
PF
L 
Bi
bli
oth
èq
ue
] a
t 0
2:1
4 2
3 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
1 
if a person has a pure deficit in awareness, that person
should be able to react to a stimulus, point to a stimu-
lus, and talk about a stimulus, and should lack only the
inner awareness of the stimulus.
To counter this argument, we begin with a hypothe-
tical case that we do not support. Suppose that aware-
ness is an epiphenomenon. It is an inner feeling that
serves no function and has no outward impact on
behavior. In that case, C&P would be right. A loss of
awareness should produce a zombie that acts normally
but has no inner experience. C&P’s view of neglect, we
suggest, comes from inadvertently thinking of aware-
ness as mainly an epiphenomenon.
The difficulty with the epiphenomenon view is that
it is logically impossible. We can report that we are
conscious. Indeed everyone participating in this print
discussion has acknowledged the presence of con-
sciousness. Therefore whatever it is, it has an effect
on human behavior.
In our theory, consciousness is a perceptual model.
Like all perceptual models, it serves the purpose of
guiding behavior. Awareness may help to guide atten-
tion, cognitive analysis, and behavioral choice. It cer-
tainly has an impact on verbal report. Yet even beyond
the normal influence on behavior that any perceptual
model may have, awareness has a property that makes
it unique. In our theory, awareness is a representation of
the enhancer of representations. A natural resonance, a
positive feedback loop, must exist between awareness
(a representation of attention) and attention (the enhan-
cer of representations). Awareness and attention are
situated something like two mirrors facing each other.
Because of this resonance, awareness must profoundly
influence attention and therefore signal processing and
behavioral response.
We argue that without awareness, behavior would
be crippled, and that at least some forms of neglect do
indeed match the deficit one expects from damaging
the mechanism of awareness. Hemispatial neglect is,
classically, a loss of awareness of anything in the
affected half of space, as well as a loss of awareness
that there is such a thing as that half of space.
Frith was one of the first to propose a link between
consciousness and social intelligence. We are therefore
delighted that he takes a positive view of our approach.
He also raises several specific concerns about our
theory, and here we address a particularly important one.
Frith notes that when a person processes someone
else’s attentional state, that processing can sometimes
occur automatically, without awareness. How can an
unconscious process be the source of awareness?
We believe this criticism stems from lumping
together two items that in our theory are dissociable.
There is a distinction between a perceptual model of
someone else’s attentional state (assigning awareness
to someone else) and a perceptual model of one’s own
attentional state (assigning awareness to oneself). The
two may depend on similar neuronal machinery, but
they are two different perceptual models. The fact that
we can process someone else’s attentional state without
ourselves being aware of it does not strain the theory. In
our hypothesis, to process someone else’s attentional
state, and therefore to assign awareness to someone
else, and at the same time to be aware that we are
doing it, requires an extra layer. It requires a perceptual
model of how one’s own attentional state is focused on
someone else’s attentional state. The theory predicts
that much of the perceptual processing of other peo-
ple’s attentional state, and thus much of the attribution
of awareness to other people, occurs outside of one’s
own awareness. The underlying logic is straightfor-
ward, even if its application to specific circumstances
sometimes requires recursive complexities.
Bridgeman emphasizes the behavioral impact of
awareness. He also emphasizes that, because it has
behavioral consequences, it is subject to evolutionary
pressure. This emphasis is, in our view, exactly right. By
searching for a neuronal basis for consciousness one is
necessarily accepting a scientific, biological framework.
In that framework, traits evolve and are retained because
they have some specific impact on an organism’s survi-
val. Our hypothesis provides a possible behavioral
utility to consciousness, thereby providing at least a
theoretical account of its evolutionary path.
Van Elk and Blanke discuss the issue of first person
perspective and the out of body experience. We agree
with most of their points and find their ideas on differ-
ent types of first person perspective to be of great
interest. However, we do not agree that a body schema,
by itself, is a form of consciousness. The brain clearly
computes a body schema, which contains information
on the spatial instantiation of the self. The body schema
is complex and probably multifaceted. But an informa-
tional model of the body, constructed in the brain,
cannot by itself account for awareness. That is where
our theory becomes useful. In our theory, awareness is
information. It is an informational model, a schema
computed by the brain. But it is specifically a schema
that describes what it means to attentively process
information. It is the brain’s metaphor for the deep
processing of information. Without that metaphor
added to the mix, the body schema by itself would be
merely a simulation of the body without awareness.
Kievit and Geurts offer an insightful comment on
autism. To put this comment in a broader perspective,
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here we point out a challenge sometimes directed at
social theories of consciousness. Autistic people have
impaired social perception. If consciousness is linked to
social perception, then shouldn’t autistic people show
some deficit in consciousness? Kievit and Geurts
answer the question: they do. Autism may indeed be
associated with some loss of awareness of at least some
mental processes. Consciousness normally encom-
passes only a small fraction of the processes in the
brain; continuing to study how autistic and non-autistic
people differ in this respect may be of great interest.
Banissy, Walsh, and Muggleton discuss the phenom-
enon of mirror-touch synesthesia. A mirror-touch
synesthete will actually feel a touch on his or her own
body when merely watching someone else being
touched. This phenomenon suggests that the ability to
build a perceptual model of the experiences of others is
somehow related to one’s own perceptual awareness.
The phenomenon of mirror-touch synesthesia does not
necessarily support the specific theory of awareness
that we propose in our target article, but it does add
support to the general approach. The authors also cor-
rectly point out that social perception is likely to
involve many brain structures in addition to the few
emphasized in our article.
Smallwood discusses an important area of the litera-
ture left out of our target article: the default mode
network and its possible role in stimulus independent
thought. The commentary is informative and compel-
ling. Smallwood suggests that research on the default
mode network supports our proposal of an overlap
between regions of the brain involved in modeling
others, in modeling the self, and in awareness.
Iacoboni comments mainly on the issue of mirror
neurons in social perception and their relation to the
brain regions discussed in our article: STS, TPJ, and
DMFC. Iacoboni is quite correct that STS is the only
one of these regions to be specifically experimentally
linked to the mirror neuron system. The other areas
thus far are less well characterized and have not been
associated with the mirror neuron system. We would
point out, however, a potentially limiting aspect of the
work on mirror neurons. The experiments almost
always involve the perception of motor acts performed
by the hand, whereas social perception obviously
encompasses a much larger domain. Perhaps one rea-
son for the apparent anatomical focus of the mirror
neuron system – in STS, posterior parietal lobe, and
premotor cortex – is that the experiments are limited in
scope. Whether TPJ, DMFC, and other areas impli-
cated in social perception really have a specific role
in informing simulation mechanisms such as mirror
neurons is of course speculation on our part, and only
further experiments will clarify the issue.
We end by considering a question pertinent to all of the
commentaries and to our target article. What experi-
mental predictions does our theory make? The most
direct predictions involve compromising awareness by
damaging specific brain regions. Certainly a large
lesion to the social machinery should, by hypothesis,
also affect one’s own awareness. We argue that this
relationship explains why lesions to the right TPJ and
STS can result in hemispatial neglect.
But more specific hypotheses can be formulated. If
the task of social attention – of building a perceptual
model of someone else’s attentional state – is empha-
sized in specific neuronal structures, then by hypoth-
esis damage to those specific structures, or targeted
reversible disruption of them, should lead to a deficit
in one’s own awareness.
Likewise in neglect in which the patient’s awareness
is impaired in one spatial hemifield, the patient should
also be impaired in perceiving when someone else is
directing attention to that same hemifield.
The specificity of these predictions is important.
The theory does not predict that neglect patients should
be generally lacking in social cognitive abilities.
Likewise, the theory does not predict that awareness
should fade given any neural damage or autism-like
disability related to social perception. The proposed
relationship between awareness and social perception
is more specific and therefore more experimentally
approachable.
In summary, we are encouraged by the many useful
comments from colleagues, and we see potential for
future experiments. The proposed theory of conscious-
ness is specific, conceptually simple, and testable.
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